You can't fight City Hall, or can you? Holland man sues Town, 5 Boards, Departments and 19 town officials and former town officials in Federal District Court.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO.04-30070KPN

Peter K. Frei,
Plaintiff,

TOWN OF HOLLAND, BOARD OF HEALTH, HOLLAND CONSERVATION COMMISSION, HOLLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, PLANNING BOARD, ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, Ronald Benoit, Debra Benveniste, Sally Blais, Richard Blease, Harold E. Congdon, Robert Dymon, Robert Ford, Kevin Gleason, Benjamin Haller, William Hardy, Earl Johnson, Helen Kreiger, Marilyn LaPlante, Joanne May, Vincent J. McCaughey, Dora Metrelis, Arthur A. Quinn, Brian Roche, John Stevens,
Defendant(s)

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
(for violations of civil rights)

Plaintiff herewith, by the authority given under rule 15(a) of the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, amends his complaint.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves a dispute over land use between landowner Peter Frei, "plaintiff" pro see, a native of Switzerland, and the town of Holland and some of it's officials and former officials, where the land is located. This dispute has taken numerous forms, started many years ago, (1987), and involved multiple judicial decisions by various executive branches.

Up to this point, plaintiff was optimistic that the town officials would ultimately stop discriminating against him and accept the fact that plaintiff would not leave, and for that reason never filed an action pleading the various civil rights violations perpetrated by the town of Holland and some of it's town officials, and former town officials, against plaintiff.

Prior disputes always ended in a final judgment or decision in plaintiff's favor.

Since the town of Holland and some of it's officials continue to unlawfully oppress, harass, intimidate, retaliate, conspire against, discriminate against, intimidate, etc., plaintiff, due to his national origin, and/or for exercising his rights and for petitioning the courts and other authorities for redress, the plaintiff is filing this complaint. Plaintiff gave up hope and lost his patience and is unwilling to endure such injury any longer.

These ongoing violations of plaintiff's rights, granted under the United States Constitution, United States Code, Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Massachusetts General Law, Law of Equity and Common Law, by the town and some of it's officials and former officials, consistently relates to plaintiff's effort to develop and enjoy his property, and also to sell part of his property.

The town of Holland is a small community. Most town officials are a group of people accustomed to doing business "their way," holding commission on different boards, changing over time, and "covering," instead of checking each other, to guarantee the needed constitutional control over office holders.

This continuous trespass by some of the town officials and former town officials, listed as defendant(s) in this action, constitutes a continued act or a continued series of acts, or a pattern of acts of same nature.

Defendant(s) actions, and the fundamental procedural irregularities of their actions, are unexplainable other than being based on a scheme of oppressive discriminatory animus and a broad-based multifaceted conspiracy by the defendant(s) towards plaintiff, which constitutes a deliberate and arbitrary abuse of power.

Different claims are within the statues of limitations (title 28 U.S.C., s.1658); the rest are admissible under the "continuing violation doctrine." The "continuing violation doctrine" is an "equitable exception" to the timely filing requirement. In the case at bar, the continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts by the defendant(s) and a campaign of oppression, conspiracy, harassment, retaliation and discrimination against plaintiff, which defendant(s) engaged in.

Plaintiff has a pending action in Hampden Superior Court against the Planning Board and the town of Holland, defendant(s), for an order in mandamus to compel the planning board and the town of Holland to endorse plaintiff's Approval Not Required subdivision plan, thereafter ANR plan, a violation of substantive due process, and constructive taking of property (HDCV2002-1196). In that action, plaintiff has only named the Planning Board of Holland, thereafter PBH, and the town of Holland as defendant(s). No individual is named as defendant, and no defendant(s) are named in their individual capacity in that action.

Remedies under state statutes, Massachusetts General Law, thereafter M.G.L., are insufficient and inadequate to grant relief on the claim for substantive due process and the claim for constructive taking of property, in said action in Superior Court.

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff will be specific with allegations establishing discriminatory animus, conspiracy, and due process violations, to meet the heightened pleading standard for such allegations.

Plaintiff also notes the recent legal debate in raising the evidence standard on punitive damage awards to a more exacting standard, (aggravating conduct).

The large volume of the factual statements and the pleadings in this complaint is unusual but necessary to get the "whole picture" and to satisfy the increased need for more specific allegations to meet the increased burden of proof for such allegations.

The unusual volume of facts and pleadings reflect the immeasurable injustice perpetrated by the town of Holland and some of its officials, and former officials, against the plaintiff over the last seventeen (17) years.

Plaintiff is pro se and does not have any formal legal education. Plaintiff is aware of the increasing bias towards pro se litigation, where pro se litigants have pleadings and motions written by ghost- writers, lawyers who draft or write papers in the background, without filing a formal appearance. Plaintiff affirms, that this complaint and all his other legal papers, including the papers filed in Superior Court, are researched and written by himself, without any help from lawyers.

PARTIES

PLAINTIFF:

Peter K. Frei, 101 Maybrook Road, Holland, MA 01521,
phone: 413 245 4660

DEFENDANT(S):
Defendant TOWN OF HOLLAND is a municipality of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts located in Hampden County, with the mailing address: Town of Holland, 27 Sturbridge Road, Holland MA, 01521, Phone (413) 245 7108. Defendant Town of Holland is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant BOARD OF HEALTH (BOH), town of Holland, is and was at all relevant times a municipal corporation. Defendant BOH is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant HOLLAND CONSERVATION COMMISSION (HCC), town of Holland, is and was at all relevant times a municipal corporation. Defendant HCC is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant HOLLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT (HPD), town of Holland, is and was at all relevant times a municipal corporation. Defendant HPD is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant PLANNING BOARD Holland (PBH), town of Holland, is and was at all relevant times a municipal corporation. Defendant PBH is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS (ZBA), town of Holland, is and was at all relevant times a municipal corporation. Defendant ZBA is sued in its official capacity.
Defendant Ronald Benoit is an individual residing at Brimfield Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was building inspector of the town of Holland. Defendant Benoit is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Debra Benveniste is an individual residing at 34 Maybrook Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was and is chair woman of the PBH of the town of Holland. Defendant Benveniste is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Sally Blais is an individual residing at 28 Overlook Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was chairman of BOH. Defendant Blais is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Richard Blease is an individual residing at 224 Stafford Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was electrical inspector of the town of Holland.
Defendant Harold E. Congdon is an individual residing at , 21 Hisgen Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was chairman of the BOH of the town of Holland. Defendant Condon is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Robert Dymon is an individual residing at Lake Shore Drive, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was member of BOH and inspector of BOH. Defendant Dymon is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Robert Ford is an individual residing at 8 Hawthorne Ridge Circle, Trumbull, CT 06611 and at relevant times was town clerk of the town of Holland. Defendant Ford is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Kevin Gleason is an individual residing at 122 Mashapaug Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was a police officer of the HPD and is chief of Police. Defendant Gleason is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Benjamin Haller is an individual residing at 7 Bell Street, Montclair, NJ 07042-2232 and at relevant times was chairman of the ZBA. Defendant Haller is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant William Hardy is an individual residing at 12 Bennett Lane, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was chairman of the HCC. Defendant Hardy is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Earl Johnson is an individual residing at Hisgen Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was and is member of the PBH and member of the Board of selectmen. Defendant Johnson is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Helen Kreiger is an individual residing at Lake Shore Drive, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was a member of the HCC. Defendant Kreiger is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Marilyn LaPlante is an individual residing at 257 Mashapaug Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was member of the PBH. Defendant LaPlante is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Joanne May is an individual residing at Union Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was and is secretary of the PBH. Defendant May is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Vincent J. McCaughey is an individual residing at Burbank Avenue, Warren, MA 01083, with office at 807 Main Street, Warren, MA 01083 and at relevant times was and is town counsel for the town of Holland. Defendant Vincent J. McCaughey is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Dora Metrelis is an individual residing at Sandy Beach Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was member of BOH and chairman of BOH. Defendant Metrelis is sued individually and in her official capacity.
Defendant Arthur A. Quinn, P.E., is an individual residing at Collette Drive, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was sanitarian of the BOH. Defendant Quinn is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant Brian Roche is an individual residing at Stafford Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was and is member of the PBH and was member of HCC. Defendant Roche is sued individually and in his official capacity.
Defendant John Stevens is an individual residing at 1 Old Acres Road, Holland, MA 01521 and at relevant times was chairman of the BOH. Defendant Stevens is sued individually and in his official capacity.
DEFENDANT(S) NOT INCLUDED AND REASONS:

Maria Scott, deceased; Humphrey Sutton, deceased; John Martin, untraceable; Fred Grabau, untraceable; Jeffry Wojtowicz, untraceable; Sally Byrne untraceable; Rene Tetrault, untraceable.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This action arises under the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C., s.1983; and 42 U.S.C., s.1985).
This honorable court has jurisdiction based on general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C., s.1331. For the purposes of general federal question jurisdiction, the requisite jurisdictional amount is pleaded and exists.
This honorable court has civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C., s.1343.
Massachusetts three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, M.G.L., c.260,s.2A, is applicable to 42 U.S.C., s.1983, 42 U.S.C., s.1985.
Different claims are within the statues of limitations (title 28 U.S.C., s.1658), the rest are admissible under the "continuing violation doctrine."
In the case at bar, the continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts by the defendant(s) and a campaign of oppression, conspiracy, harassment, retaliation and discrimination against plaintiff, that defendant(s) engaged in.
Venue is properly claimed, 23 of the 25 defendants and the plaintiff reside in Hampden County. All alleged actions were committed in Hampden County. Plaintiff's property is located in Hampden County.
Two of the defendants (Robert Ford and Benjamin Haller) reside in other states. This two defendants do have sufficient nexus to Hampden County, Massachusetts. Both were at relevant times town officials of the town of Holland.
M.G.L., c.4,s.6(Ninth), provides a penalty or forfeiture for each violation of the law, wherever provided.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
March 23, 1987: William F. Arnold signs letter in which he gives plaintiff and a friend permission to occupy his property as guests in consideration of the pending sale of said property, (book 6519, page 178), located on a private way, off of Maybrook Road, Holland.
April 30, 1987: Plaintiff signs "purchase agreement" for said property. The execution of the contract was subject to approval of an individual subsurface sewage disposal system by the BOH.
May, June, 1987: The Board Of Health, thereafter BOH, refuses to issue a percolation test permit and denies plaintiff the right to do a percolation test on said property.
The request for a percolation test was in full compliance with 310 CMR 15.03 and all other applicable sections of 310 CMR 15.00 as in full force and effect on 3/31/1983, and local bylaws.
BOH requests the plaintiff to install a leach field 100 feet away from the lake, twice the distance required by 310 CMR 15.00 in plaintiff's situation, a requirement the plaintiff was not able to meet due to the size of the property. This request was arbitrary and not legitimate.
BOH, refused to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for a subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach pit, date of blueprint, 06-11-87.
BOH refused to issue a construction permit for the installation of the proposed subsurface sewage disposal system.
Plaintiff's plan for the proposed subsurface sewage disposal system was in compliance with 310 CMR 15.02(5) and all other applicable sections of 310 CMR 15.00 as in full force and effect on 3/31/1983, and local bylaws.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of this regular subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach facility 50 feet away from the lake shoreline.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuance of a construction permit for his subsurface sewage disposal system.
The Code of Massachusetts Regulations, thereafter CMR, was issued by the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, thereafter DEQE and is authorized by M.G.L., c.21A,s.13. The DEQE was later renamed to Department of Environmental Protection, thereafter DEP.
Guided by discriminatory animus, the members of the BOH request that the plaintiff install a holding tank, in clear violation of 310 CMR 15.00 and the "TIGHT TANK POLICY," Sanitary Sewage- Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, February 24, 1977, which provides:

Existing Situation: A tight tank may be approved under Regulation 18.1 of Title 5 of the State Environmental Code (310 CMR 15.00) to eliminate an existing malfunctioning subsurface sanitary sewage disposal system when, in the opinion of the Regional Engineer having jurisdiction over subsurface sewage disposal, there is no feasible alternative. Evidence must accompany application for approval showing proof of no "feasible alternative." Reasonable variances from the code must be carefully considered prior to approval of any tight tank.
BOH refusal to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for a subsurface sewage disposal system is an attempt to prevent plaintiff from buying said property.
The arbitrary request of a distance of 100 feet between the leach facility and the shore line was made in an attempt to prevent plaintiff from buying said property.
May, June 1987: The BOH requests the plaintiff to buy more land to accommodate a leach field 100 feet away from the lake instead of the 50 feet required by 310 CMR 15.03(7), (as in full force and effect on 3/31/83). This request is arbitrary and has no base in law or equity.
May 23, 1987: The BOH posted a notice with the wrong date (June 23.1987) on the entrance door to the cottage on said property, declaring the dwelling a "health hazard," and ordering the cottage "not to be occupied for human habitation."
This order was arbitrary and capricious and had no base in law or equity.
The purpose was to oppress, discriminate, intimidate and to prevent and discourage plaintiff from buying the property.
The water supply, (hand pump), and the subsurface sewage disposal system, (privy), were both legal under the grandfather clause at that time.
May 23, 1987: Together with the forgoing notice, the BOH posted a separate document, a violation checklist, signed by Bob Dymon, inspector, and Harold Congdon, chairman.
The violations stated on such document were arbitrary, capricious, and had no base in law or equity.
May 23, 1987: Plaintiff was never notified about the alleged inspections of the cottage on May 15, 1987 at 5:40pm and May 20, 1987 at 4:30pm as outlined in the document mentioned in the previous paragraph. To the best of plaintiff's knowledge and belief, these alleged inspections never took place. At notime had any member of the BOH entered the dwelling for an inspection.
June 3, 1987: Owner of adjoining land, Priscilla Cohen, sends letter, denying plaintiff's inquiry to buy more land to accommodate a leach facility 100 feet away from the lake. Plaintiff's inquiry was to satisfy the unjust request by the members of the BOH.
June 11, 1987: Plaintiff bought property, deed 42672, book 6519, page 178, from previous owner, William F. Arnold. Plaintiff signed a purchase agreement on April 30, 1987, and closed on this day on the purchase of the property.
July 15, 1987: Supernant Corp. revised plaintiff's plan "proposed gravity system with holding tank below lake level."
This revision was according to an arbitrary and capricious request by the members of the BOH. This is the 2nd set of plans for plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system.
Three years later, plaintiff learned from Helen Kreiger that the chief of police of the town of Holland at that time, the building inspector, Ronald Benoit, at that time, and the members of the BOH at that time, conspired against plaintiff for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from buying said property by refusing to approve plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, which a potential buyer needed to obtain a mortgage from a bank. Fortunately plaintiff had the funds to pay cash for the property, otherwise the conspirers would have succeeded in preventing plaintiff from buying said property. Helen Kreiger is a well known member of this community, and a member of the HCC to this day.
April 12, 1988: Plaintiff submits to BOH plan: Original Holding Tank by Suprenant Corp. Revised July 15, 1987. Proposed gravity system of Holding Tank 36' from the lake shoreline.
This is the 2nd plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system.
Members of the BOH approve plaintiff's 2nd plan under the condition that plaintiff will have to move the Holding Tank to higher level.
This request is arbitrary, capricious, and has no base in law or equity.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of a subsurface sewage disposal system plan with a leach facility.
June 17, 1988: BOH issues Certificate of Compliance for subsurface sewage disposal system with illegal Holding Tank.
July 12, 1988: Holland BOH approves "as-built" Holding TankPlan by Cox Environmental Engineer, dated July 5, 1988.
This plan is in clear violation of 310 CMR 15.20, and 310 CMR 15.18(1), (as in full force and effect on 3/31/83).
This is the 3rd subsurface sewage disposal system plan.
Further, plaintiff never applied for a variance for a "tight tank" as required under 310 CMR 15.20.
Plaintiff did not need a variance and had a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of a regular subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach facility.
March 20, 1989: Plaintiff buys adjoining piece of property, deed number 14974, book 7120, page 529.
Summer 1990: Plaintiff intends to install an artesian well on property he bought on March 20, 1989.
BOH denies issuing a permit, due to alleged owed back taxes for property.
Plaintiff was never notified and lawyers involved in the property transaction which took place on March 20, 1989, exercised their duty to notify respective offices of the transaction.
February 24, 1993: Plaintiff receives letter from the BOH, requesting information on frequency of occupation on his dwelling and frequency of pumping of his tight tank.
April 27, 1993: Letter to the DEQE by the plaintiff. In preparation of a second attempt to install a subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach facility, plaintiff inquires again in regard to local bylaws filed with the state, in particular, the required distance between the shore line of a lake and a leach facility.
May 11, 1993: Plaintiff submits new plan "PROPOSED SUBSURFACE SEWAGE TREATMENT & DISPOSAL SYSTEM PREPARED FOR PETER FREI OFF MAYBROOK ROAD- HOLLAND, MASS."
This plan is the 4th plan. This new plan consists of a septic tank and a leach pit at least 50 feet away from the lake, and more than 100 feet away from the well, as required by law.
BOH rejects 4th plan with leaching pit.
In a further attempt to prevent plaintiff from installing a subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach facility, BOH requests an impermeable barrier, 6' deep, 1'wide, and 90'long (compact clay, 4-mil double-thickness Polyethylene), allegedly to prevent sewage from leaching out sideways.
310 CMR 15.00, (as in full force and effect on 3/31/83), does not require such a barrier in this situation. Such a request is arbitrary, capricious, and outside the authority of the BOH.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of a regular subsurface sewage disposal plan as proposed in his 4th plan, without the requested impermeable barrier.
May 12, 1993: Response from the DEQE, stating that 50 feet distance is required, plaintiff should contact the HCC.
June 1, 1993: BOH issues a permit for a percolation test (number 60193-3).
In June of 1987, the BOH denied plaintiff this percolation test, without any legal grounds.
June 30, 1993: Plaintiff and his engineer, Richard Cox, Environmental Engineering Inc., submit new plan.
This is the 5th plan plaintiff submits to the BOH. This plan includes the requested impermeable barrier not needed or supported by 310 CMR 15.00.
July 7, 1993: Plaintiff files Notice of Intent, thereafter NOI, with the HCC, for proposed construction work including the installation of a leaching facility, a 90 linear foot impermeable barrier, and replacement of existing rock foundation underneath the existing cottage with a concrete foundation.
HCC refuses to issue receipt acknowledging the filing of this NOI, as requested by M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
July 30, 1993: DEP issues the file number 184-83 for the project.
August 18, 1993: HCC Public Hearing closed, DEP file number 184-83.
Public hearing with HCC was open for 42 days instead of the 21 day period in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b), 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a) and M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
Plaintiff did not give his consent to keep the public hearing open.
All feasible permits were obtained by plaintiff; therefore, defendant(s) also violated provisions under 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e) and 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f).
September 8, 1993: HCC in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a) failed to issue the Order of Condition within the 21 day time period, which expired this day.
This conduct is also in violation of M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
HCC delays issuing said Order of Conditions until December 15, 1993.
September 15, 1993: In violation of M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, BOH failed to make a decision within 45 days on submitted plans.
Plaintiff's 5th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system became constructively approved on this day.
November 12, 1993: Richard Cox sends letter by certified mail to BOH requesting that BOH forward a copy of the Board's decision.
November 12, 1993: Richard Cox sends letter by certified mail to HCC requesting that HCC would forward a copy of the commissions decision.
November 18, 1993: Despite the constructive approval of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, BOH ignores the statutory provisions of M.G.L., c.111,s.31E and continues to harass and discriminate against plaintiff.
In a letter, the BOH stated that both HCC and BOH are "concerned about the possibility of leachate entering the Hamilton Reservoir;"
this is a capricious ridiculous attempt to thwart plaintiff's project and does not have any base in law or equity and is outside the BOH's jurisdiction.
This is an alleged personal concern of the Board members; the Board members don't have any discretion in this matter.
The letter states further,

"because a tight tank had been installed on the property,"
plaintiff was forced to install this tight tank in violation of plaintiff's rights and in violation of 310 CMR 15.18(1) and the Tight Tank Policy; the letter states further,

"the application for a disposal works construction permit is denied at this time."
This decision did not have any base in law or equity and was made after 3 months and 18 days instead of the 45 day period mandated under M.G.L., c.111,s.31E.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuing of a disposal work construction permit, to install and add the leach facility.
December 15, 1993: 119 days after the submittal of the NOI, (the law permits not more then 21 days), HCC issues "order of conditions" for proposed construction work including the installation of a leaching facility, a 90 linear foot impermeable barrier, and replacement of existing rock foundation with a concrete foundation.
The order of conditions provided:

Installation of the subsurface sewage disposal system has been denied "Given the close proximity to the Hamilton Reservoir, steep side slopes, inadequate breakout distance and very sandy soil, (Perk rate - 2 min./inch) it is the opinion of the HCC that there is significant concern that leachate will contaminate the reservoir. Moreover, the proposed Septic System is to replace a tight tank. To have obtained approval from DEP for a tight tank, the applicant had to have proved that there was no other method of installing a subsurface sewage disposal system at that time. From the inspection of the property, there appears to be no change in the property from when the tight tank was approved."
The term "breakout distance" is a term used in situations with a so called "mounted subsurface sewage disposal system." Plaintiff's system is not a "mounted system."
HCC does not have any discretion in denying an application addressed to the BOH for installing a subsurface sewage disposal system. HCC is an independent municipal agency.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuing of orders of conditions by the HCC, allowing plaintiff all proposed activities.
December 15, 1993: Humphrey Sutton, chairman of HCC, knew that plaintiff would leave the country in the beginning of October to spend the winter in Switzerland.
Instead of sending plaintiff the order of conditions no later than September 8, Humphrey Sutton waited another 98 days to send plaintiff the order of conditions.
Humphrey Sutton knew, or should have known, that plaintiff had only 10 days to appeal.
By mailing the letter to plaintiff's address in Brimfield, just 9 days before Christmas eve, he assured that it was impossible for plaintiff to receive the document in time to file a request for a superseding "Order of Conditions" on the unlawful denial from HCC with the DEP within the allowed time period.
December 29, 1993: Plaintiff filed a request for a superseding "Order of Conditions" on denial by the HCC with the DEP (DEP file number 184-83). Plaintiff requests that DEP contact Richard Cox.
January 14, 1994: Letter from the DEP requesting unspecified title 5 variance documentation.
February 14, 1994: Richard Cox revised plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plans according to the BOH's latest request: replacement of leach pit by leach field.
This is another arbitrary request outside the requirements of 310 CMR 15.00.
BOH also decides that there is no need for title 5 variance.
This is the 6th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system.
February 17, 1994: Richard Cox mailed copies of revised subsurface sewage disposal system plan to BOH, HCC, and DEP.
February 26, 1994: BOH noted receipt of revised septic plans, will forward plans to town sanitarian following ruling from HCC.
Ruling by HCC is arbitrary and capricious. BOH is independent sole agency having policing authority to approve subsurface sewage disposal system design applications.
February 28, 1994: Letter from HCC to Cox stating:

"prior to review of this plan we will require a written explanation of why a tight tank was originally installed rather than a subsurface sewage disposal system, and what has changed which will allow the installation of a subsurface sewage disposal system and leaching field. Moreover, please supply the HCC with any documentation to or from the BOH or the DEP concerning the existing tight tank. Please note that a variance from DEP concerning the breakout distance will be required before we render our final opinion"
The request for a variance "concerning breakout distance" has no legality and is only applicable to so called "mounted" subsurface sewage disposal systems.
BOH, by law, is required to keep a record of all documents in regard to public meetings, see 310 CMR 15.24 (4), as in effect at that time.
Requests by the HCC do not have any base in law or equity.
Requests by the HCC are part of scheme to harass, discriminate and conspire with BOH to sabotage plaintiff's plan to improve his property, and in the process, deprive plaintiff of the privileges secured to him by the constitution of the United States.
March 9, 1994: DEP denies Superseding Order of Conditions for NOI with the file number 184-83.
Submittal of requested variance from title 5 was not received.
Plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system as proposed on revised plans requires no variance and should have been constructed in 1988, 6 (six) years earlier.
April 3, 1994: The mandated 45 day period for reviewing septic plans according to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, has elapsed for the second time.
Said plans had been submitted to BOH on February 16, 1994.
Plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plans again became constructively approved according to s.31E.
Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of his plans.
May 5, 1994: Plaintiff files a request for an adjudicatory hearing on the denial of the Superseding Order of Conditions, file number 184-83.
June 14, 1994: Letter from Richard Cox to BOH, reminding them of the mandatory period of 45 days pursuant to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, for reviewing septic plans, and that BOH is an independent Board as is the HCC. Also stating that plaintiff's plans are in compliance with title 5.
BOH is an independent Board, HCC is an independent Board.
June 27, 1994: Letter from BOH stating that plans submitted on February 16, 1994, 130 days ago, do comply with title 5 according to Sanitarian.
Instead of issuing the requested construction permit for which plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest and which became constructively approved twice pursuant to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, BOH is ignoring the law and fails to issue the necessary construction permit.
July 21, 1994: Phone call from Mr. O'Connell, selectman, suggesting that plaintiff should submit his NOI at the upcoming public hearing on August 3, after which plaintiff could mail copy of NOI to the DEP, and if DEP would approve plaintiff's NOI, the BOH would approve plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan.
This is clearly improper, as BOH is an independent agency and is obligated to approve plaintiff's plan, for which plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest.
July 29, 1994: Filing of second NOI, (first filing took place on July 7, 1993), "The installation of a leaching facility, 90 linear foot impermeable barrier, regrading, looming & seeding. The replacement of an existing rock foundation and renovation of the existing roof."
HCC refuses to issue receipt acknowledging the filing of this NOI, as requested by M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
August 3, 1994: Public hearing with HCC on NOI number 184-86. Plaintiff's engineer, Richard Cox, is attending the meeting. This meeting will be kept open by the HCC until May 2, 1995.
August 8, 1994: DEP issues file number 184-86 for NOI filed on July 29, 1994.
August 17, 1994: HCC public hearing continues. Richard Cox is attending the meeting.
August 19, 1994: HCC fails to issue Order of Conditions for NOI filed by plaintiff on July 29, 1994, within the 21 day period in which HCC is mandated to issue such order pursuant to M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
Without plaintiff's consent, HCC keeps the public hearing on NOI, file number 184-86, open until May 2, 1995.
Such conduct is in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b).
August 22, 1994: Richard Cox is staking the subsurface sewage disposal system according to a request from HCC.
September 7, 1994: BOH reverses their decision of June 27, 1994. stating;

"Use of a barrier to address steep slope issues and to lengthen the flow of the leachate requires a variance from the State." "The use of a pump to transfer waste directly from the house to the storage tank may require a variance from the state."
Pumping to a tight tank or holding tank does not require a variance, pumping to a septic tank does require a variance, see 310 CMR 15.09(1), (as in full force and effect on 3/31/83).
Further the BOH states in their letter:

"In addition, it is our understanding that you plan to use the existing tight tank as a septic tank in your proposed system. Any alteration in the use of an existing tight tank requires a variance from the state."
This is another arbitrary request with no legal base, (see entry October 11, 1994).
The clay barrier was an arbitrary capricious request of the members of the BOH.
September 1994: BOH refuses to grant a variance for the impermeable barrier as requested by the very same Board.
BOH suggests to change plans back to a system without barrier, see entry May 11, 1993.
September 20, 1994: Plaintiff attends the HCC meeting. HCC keeps public hearing open.
October 5, 1994: Plaintiff attends another HCC meeting.
Members request that plaintiff withdraws his request for an adjudicatory Hearing on the denial of the Superseding Order of Conditions, file number 184-83, which plaintiff filed on May 5, 1994 with the DEP.
Contingent on compliance with this unlawful request, HCC promises to issue order of conditions on foundation work and work on roof of dwelling.
HCC keeps public hearing open without plaintiff's consent.
October 7, 1994: Plaintiff calls Mr. Golonka, DEP, requests a phone conference between Mr. Golonka, Richard Cox, and himself.
October 11, 1994: Phone conversation with Mr. Golonka, Mr. Richard Cox, and plaintiff. Golonka explains that no variance is needed to change a holding tank to a septic tank, as stated in the letter of BOH, dated September 7, 1994. Mr. Golonka will check plans in order to determine if the slope set back requirements comply with title 5. The use of a pump prior to a septic tank does need approval by the DEP. Mr. Golonka requests specification on pump.
October 17, 1994: HCC issues (after 56 days instead of 21 days) only a portion of the Order of Conditions, (NOI file number 184-86), the part with foundation and roof, making the capricious request to raise the house without using hydraulics, that all excavation for the proposed foundation would have to be done by hand, thus making it almost impossible to execute the work. The rest of the Order of Conditions is not issued until May 2, 1995.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuance of the entire Order of Conditions no later than August 19, 1994, see M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
November 10, 1994: Following the request of the BOH, Richard Cox revises subsurface sewage disposal system plan by removing the impermeable barrier that members of the BOH requested on May 11, 1993.
This set of subsurface sewage disposal system plans is the 7th set.
November 15, 1994: Cox sends new plans, 7th set of plans, and requested information on sewage pump to BOH, DEP and HCC.
November 16, 1994: Plaintiff attends the HCC meeting and Zoning Board of Appeals, thereafter ZBA, meeting.
November 22, 1994: Plaintiff and his engineer, Richard Cox, are attending the BOH meeting. BOH denies plaintiff the right to a toilet and running water in the proposed two story garage.
BOH has no discretion in this matter. Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in having plumbing in his two story garage.
December 6, 1994: Plaintiff is attending the BOH meeting.
December 12, 1994: DEP requests additional information on pump and pump basin within 60 days.
December 27, 1994: DEP issues "Order to show cause re Dismissal," in regard to the request for an adjudicatory hearing on the denial of the Superseding Order of Conditions, file number 184-83. Since plaintiff filed second NOI on July 29, 1994, (file no. 184-86), this request and this adjudicatory hearing in itself, are insignificant and moot at this point.
January 27, 1995: Richard Cox sends additional information requested by DEP to DEP, HCC, BOH.
February 7, 1995: DEP issues "Final Decision- Order of Dismissal" on plaintiff's request for an adjudicatory hearing on the denial of the Superseding Order of Conditions, file number 184-83, docket number 94-040.
February 14, 1995: Letter from the DEP approving plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system.
April 4, 1995: BOH finally signs and approves plaintiff's plan titled "PROPOSED SUBSURFACE SEWAGE TREATMENT & DISPOSAL SYSTEM, PREPARED FOR PETER FREI OFF MAYBROOK ROAD- HOLLAND, MASS," and issues "Disposal Works Installer's Permit."
This is the wrong document, BOH should have issued a so-called "Disposal Works Construction Permit," according to 310 CMR 15.02(1) as in full force and effect on 3-31-83.
Plaintiff insisted in getting the proper document, but BOHmembers were unable to produce the correct document.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the approval of this regular subsurface sewage disposal system with a leach facility from the outset.
BOH to this date (filing of this complaint) continues with the scheme of harassment and refuses to issue "Certificate of Compliance" for arbitrary, capricious reasons.
May 2, 1995: HCC is closing public hearing which was opened August 3, 1994.
Public hearing was open for 262 days, instead of the mandatory 21 day limit, prescribed under 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a) and M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
June 7, 1995: HCC issues Order of Conditions for NOI file number 184-86 filed on July 29, 1994.
HCC also violated 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b), as plaintiff did not consent in any way to keep the public meeting open.
June 13, 1995: Letter from plaintiff to HCC informing HCC of start of construction work on leach trench.
June 21, & 22, 1995, final inspection of the installed subsurface sewage disposal system. Maria Scott, a member of the BOH; Richard Cox, engineer; Glen Hitchcock, installer; and plaintiff, owner, were present.
During a BOH meeting, Sally Blais, chairman, refused to acknowledge the fact that this inspection took place, in an attempt to justify her refusal to allow plaintiff to connect his two-story garage to the subsurface sewage disposal system, see entry of March 21, 2000.
June 22, 1995: In conformance with 310 CMR 15.021(3), on or around this date, Richard Cox sends a letter with as built plan to the BOH.
As the BOH issued the wrong permit, (see entry April 4, 1995), (a "Disposal Works Installer's Permit" instead of a "Disposal Works Construction Permit"), the part that the member of the Board would sign-off after inspecting the installed system, was not included with the letter.
This is the fault of BOH, and is not the plaintiff's, his engineer's, or the installer's fault.
Plaintiff tried to get the correct permit, and members of the BOH refused to comply, see entry April 4, 1995.
To this day, plaintiff is still waiting for a "Certificate of Compliance" which needs to be issued by the BOH pursuant to 310 CMR 15.021(3), (as in full force and effect on 3/31/83).
Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuance of document "Certificate of Compliance," see also entries of March 21, 2000, March 20, 2001, April 3, 2001.
October 14, 1995: Humphrey Sutton conducts a visit to plaintiff's property, complains about the utility trench not being part of the NOI, and is making the false accusations that the shed would not conform to plans submitted.
October 15, 1995: Humphrey Sutton is back on the property with John Martin, another member of the HCC. They check out the site, and have nothing to complain about. Both leave without comment.
October 17, 1995: Richard Blease, electrical inspector for the town of Holland, inspects utility trench through the lake bed.
According to Blease, the trench is ok, but power lines could not be buried underneath the water, due to an alleged violation of the local and national electrical code. The conduit for phone, cable TV, and propane gas are allowed according to Blease.
Blease was wrong with his allegation, see entry of January 16, 1996, and April 5, 1996.
Subsequently, Mr. Blease, electrical inspector, refuses to issue permit by avoiding phone calls and ignoring letters from plaintiff. Only after intervention by Jim Foley, selectman, Blease acknowledges plaintiff's effort to get a permit.
Blease refuses to inspect the "rough in" of plaintiff's dwelling.
Once plaintiff wanted to have the "rough in" inspected as required by law, Blease chose to resign, in order to avoid having to inspect plaintiff,s "rough in" of his remodeled dwelling. Plaintiff had to wait until the town found another electrical inspector.
October 18, 1995: After removing conduit for power lines, in compliance with another unjustified request by a town official, plaintiff back fills the trench and is flying to Switzerland the same day.
October 18, 1995: Letter from HCC stating that plaintiff caused work to be performed in violation of CH.XV of the town of Holland bylaws, trenching and installing conduit, structural work not conforming, and also requesting plaintiff to appear before the HCC on posted meeting on October 24, 1995.
October 18, 1995: Initiated by Humphrey Sutton, HCC is posting a "cease and desist" order on plaintiff's project in which Plaintiff remodelled his dwelling.
November 21, 1995: Plaintiff files an application for a special permit with the ZBA, to add a balcony on the south side of the house under construction, on the second floor, size 5' by 12'.
December 19, 1995: Scheduled public hearing takes place despite a snow storm. Plaintiff's opponent from the HCC, Humphrey Sutton, is also present.
Benjamin Haller, chairman of the ZBA and friend of Humphrey Sutton, denies the application by applying the wrong statute (M.G.L., c.40A,s.10 instead of M.G.L., c.40A,s.6), ignoring the preexisting nonconforming nature of the structure, and plaintiff's rights under the so-called "grandfather clause."
Benjamin Haller knew or should have known, that plaintiff's property was under the protection of the so called "grandfather clause".
Benjamn Haller was a longtime member of the ZBA and a lawyer by profession.
December 29, 1995: ZBA sends written denial to plaintiff on his petition to construct a balcony on his cottage.
January 16, 1996: Plaintiff files "pro se" complaint against ZBA and challenges the decision of the ZBA, Superior Court, civil action number HDCV1996-71.
January 16, 1996: Plaintiff sends letter to the State Board of Examiners of Electricians, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, asking their opinion on the utility trench in the lake bed, challenging the electrical inspector's (Richard Blease) misconstrued interpretation of the Electrical Code, denying plaintiff his right to underground service to his cottage.
February 1, 1996: ZBA, (defendant's) attorney, Vincent McCaughey, files his answer and counter claim to plaintiff's complaint against the ZBA.
February 20, 1996: Plaintiff files answer to counter claim.
April 4, 1996: Plaintiff receives a phone call from Minth Tonthat, DEP. Mr. Tonthat confirms that plaintiff is allowed to dig trench for underground service through the lake bed.
April 5, 1996: Letter from the Board of State Examiners of Electricians stating:

"In my opinion this installation appears to be in compliance with the Massachusetts Electrical Code," signed by James Roger, Executive Secretary.
April 30: 1996: HCC meeting canceled.
May 7, 1996: Plaintiff is attending the HCC meeting. Humphrey Sutton refuses to amend NOI to include utility trench, steps in front of house, and concrete pier foundation for propane gas tank. He requests plaintiff to excavate and remove the four buried conduits for underground service of power and other utilities, due to alleged violation of zoning bylaws.
May 13, 1996: HCC is inspecting the proposed steps and the concrete pier foundation for the propane gas tank.
July 10, 1996: Plaintiff seeks professional help to cope with extreme mental and emotional distress due to stress in conjunction with his ongoing "pro se" lawsuit in Superior Court against the ZBA, the ongoing harassment and discrimination by the HCC, the ongoing harassment and discrimination by the electrical inspector, and the ongoing conspiracy by some of the town officials. On this day, plaintiff attends therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., Sturbridge Human Services, 450 Main Street, Sturbridge, MA 01566.
July 17, 1996: Plaintiff attends another therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., to cope with extreme mental and emotional distress.
July 30, 1996: Plaintiff attends another therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., to cope with extreme mental and emotional distress.
August 8, 1996: Plaintiff attends another therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., to cope with extreme mental and emotional distress.
August 26, 1996: Plaintiff files "Plaintiff's request for production of documents from the ZBA, defendant(s).
September 2, 1996: Plaintiff files a petition for a special permit to obtain a building permit for a two-story garage on his preexisting nonconforming lot, dated August 30, 1996.
September 3, 1996: Plaintiff files a Memorandum "PRINCIPAL POINTS IN DETAIL UPON WHICH APPLICATION HAS BEEN MADE FOR VARIANCE SO AS TO PERMIT CONSTRUCTION OF A TWO-STORY GARAGE" in support of his petition for a special permit for a two-story garage.
September 3, 1996: Plaintiff is attending a meeting with the BOH regarding the connection of the proposed two-story garage to the existing subsurface sewage disposal system.
BOH members question the necessity of plumbing in this building. They also wanted to know the distance between the foundation of the proposed two-story garage and the leach field.
After plaintiff answers their questions, BOH members are signing the procedure sheet, consenting to the proposed hook-up of the two-story garage to the existing subsurface sewage disposal system.
September 3, 1996: Plaintiff files his NOI 184-118, on the proposed two-story garage, foundation for propane gas tank, trench through the lake bed for underground service, steps in front of house, shed, and two-story garage, retaining wall, and to pave driveway with cobblestone.
September 3, 1996: HCC refuses to issue receipt for plaintiff's NOI, as mandated by M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
September 7, 1996: Plaintiff attends another therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., to cope with extreme mental and emotional distress.
September 17, 1996: DEP issues file number 184-118, on NOI filed on September 3, 1996.
September 23, 1996: Plaintiff files a plot plan and a plan giving the dimensions of the two-story garage, in support of his petition for a special permit for a two-story garage with the ZBA.
September 24, 1996: Public Hearing on NOI with HCC. Humphrey Sutton raises all kinds of capricious, arbitrary issues; he requests that plaintiff combine all plans and put all plans onto one. Humphrey Sutton falsely accuses plaintiff of not having complied with notification requirements of abutters, as mandated pursuant to M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
September 25, 1996: Plaintiff requests that the Public hearing will be continued on October 1.
September 26, 1996: Letter from HCC stating that without local permits in place and a delineation map, HCC will not continue the public hearing. HCC claims further:

"HCC will be unable to approve this work unless the installation of such a line has been approved by the relevant inspectors or departments. As these lines were not inspected when installed, we presume that the line will have to be excavated and re-laid."
Richard Blease inspected the underground conduit initially. After plaintiff questioned Richard Blease's opinion on the conduit for the power line, he refused to comment or issue the requested, and overdue, permit.
In any event, such permits need not to be issued before public hearing on plaintiff's NOI.
Humphrey Sutton's refusal to issue order of conditions is in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(4)(f), 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b), 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a), and M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
September 26, 1996: Tax Collector signs procedure and signature list required to obtain a building permit for the proposed two-story garage.
September 30, 1996: HCC (Humphrey Sutton) leaves a message on plaintiff's answering machine, informing plaintiff that HCC will not continue the public hearing scheduled for the next day due to the fact that plaintiff does not have the appropriate permits.
This is in violation of M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
September 30, 1996: Plaintiff called around to find an attorney to represent plaintiff at the HCC meeting.
October 1, 1996: Public Hearing on the petition for a special permit on for a two-story garage.
Plaintiff is accompanied by two lawyers, Bruce Leiter and Brian Harmon. Under overwhelming pressure of two lawyers, Benjamin Haller grants the special permit for the proposed two-story garage.
Right after the Public Hearing with the ZBA, the two lawyers accompanying plaintiff, and plaintiff himself, went downstairs to attend the continued public hearing with the HCC. Humphrey Sutton, chairman of HCC and personal friend of Benjamin Haller, was in disbelief when he learned that his friend Benjamin Haller granted the special permit.
October 1, 1996: HCC minutes to meeting provide:

5. Continuance of plaintiff's public hearing. Appearing with Mr. Frei, his attorney Bruce Leiter of Springfield. Plan submitted with all projects noted, but it is not a delineated map of the wetlands. Discussion continues about the power lines under the lake bed. Attorney Leiter does not think we can object until plaintiff has electrical permit. Sites a CMR law. Humphrey disagrees and discussion continues. Objection to map & book number on NOI, plus attached deed is not Peter Frei's. The Atty. says that will be straightened out. The hearing is continued again to Oct. 15, 1996 at 8:00 pm.
The request by Humphrey Sutton, chairman, for a delineated map of plaintiff's property is capricious and arbitrary and an unlawful attempt to block plaintiff's project and to harm plaintiff financially.
This ridiculous request alone costs plaintiff $6768.12 (six-thousand seven-hundred and sixty-eight dollars and twelve cents).
October 4, 1996: Plaintiff called Richard Blease, electrical inspector, and left message to set up a meeting with plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney Bruce Leiter, and Richard Blease.
October 4, 1996: Blease calls back, refuses to meet with attorney Leiter and plaintiff, wants to see a permit application before he does any thing, threatens to bring a state investigator to plaintiff's property.
October 4, 1996: Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Leiter, sends letter to HCC, correcting the record on plaintiff's deed (book 6519, page 178).
October 7, 1996: Plaintiff left permit application at door to Richard Blease's residence.
October 7, 1996: Plaintiff left message on answering machine asking what the fee would be, asking also that Mr. Blease confirm that he got the permit application.
Plaintiff called him with his cellular phone again same day and left message. Richard Blease never returned plaintiff's calls.
October 8, 1996: Plaintiff sent Richard Blease a check with the highest fee, $60,- (check number 578), just to make sure.
(Richard Blease never endorsed the check; even so, he admitted on the phone with Jim Foley, town selectman, that he got the permit application).
October, 1996: Richard Blease, electrical inspector, and Humphrey Sutton, chairman HCC, called Mr. Garon, plaintiff's electrician, and accused him falsely of doing work without a permit.
October 8, 1996: Plaintiff called his electrician, Mr. Garon, who told plaintiff that he got a call from the electrical inspector, Richard Blease, and from the chairman of HCC, Humphrey Sutton. They falsely accused him of having done work without a permit.
Mr. Garon does work as a self-employed electrician in Holland and surrounding towns and depends on the electrical inspector to inspect and approve his work. Mr. Garon also explained that electrical inspectors of the surrounding towns would know each other and he feared retaliatory actions from these inspectors as well. Intimidated by these phone calls, Mr. Garon was not interested in working with plaintiff any longer.
October 8, 1996: Plaintiff finally called Jim Foley, town selectman, to seek help. Plaintiff left message, asking him to call plaintiff back.
October 9, 1996: Plaintiff called Blease again, and left another message on his answering machine, relating that plaintiff left the permit on his door on Monday, October 7, 1996, and sent him check on Tuesday, October 8, 1996. The message asked that he call plaintiff back, and if the plaintiff did not hear from him, plaintiff would assume every thing was ok.
October 9, 1996: Humphrey Sutton, Helen Kreiger, and another member of the HCC, Carol Dion, resign.
October 10, 1996: Plaintiff attends another therapy session with Rocco Marino, Ph.D., to cope with his extreme mental and emotional distress.
October 12, 1996: Town sanitarian Arthur Quinn sends letter to BOH, listing 4 items to be examined after submittal of the plan showing the connection of the two-story garage to the existing subsurface sewage disposal system.
October 12, 1996: Plaintiff called Brian Roche and learned that there is no HCC meeting on October 15.
October 15, 1996: Helen Kreiger withdrew her resignation from the HCC.
Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Leiter, and Phd. Biologist, William Shaheen, are present. They submit Supplementary Notes requested by HCC at meeting on October 1, (delineation map, site plan etc.).
October 22, 1996: HCC is meeting with Paul Castonguay as the new chairman. Board members take a vote on plaintiff's NOI application. All four members present vote in favor of 5 out of 6 proposed activities, three members voted in favor of the second proposed activity, (change from overhead to underground service on existing house and proposed two-story garage), Brian Roach voted against the second proposed activity. HCC closes the public hearing which began on September 24, 1996, and will issue order of conditions.
November 12, 1996: HCC fails to issue Order of Condition after 21 days as required by M.G.L., c.131,s.40, and 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a), for project file number 184-118.
November 26, 1996: After the new chairman's unexpected death, without notifying plaintiff, 35 days after the closing of the public hearing in which the Board voted and accepted plaintiff's NOI in it's entirety, HCC discussed the Order of Conditions due on plaintiff's NOI.
Humphrey Sutton, former chairman of HCC and not a member of the HCC at this time, attends this meeting.
Humphrey Sutton, former chairman of HCC and not a member of HCC at this time, brought typed order of conditions on plaintiff's NOI to this meeting.
In said order of conditions, Humphry Sutton falsified unlawfully the votes taken during the official public hearing on October 22, 1996, and denied plaintiff's activities under paragraph 2. (Change from overhead to underground service on existing house, existing shed, and proposed two-story garage) and under paragraph 3. (Construction of foundation for 500 Gallon Propane Tank) as proposed in plaintiff's NOI.
There was no quorum present at that meeting of November 26, 1996, to sign the order of conditions. One of the signatures is the signature of a town selectman which was not a member of the HCC at that time. Only two members of the HCC signed the Orders of Conditions.
November 26, 1996: ZBA, (defendant), serves "INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE DEFENDANT" to Peter Frei (plaintiff) in the civil action, docket no. 96-71, (balcony on dwelling).
December 4, 1996: HCC mails the Order of Conditions, 43 days after closing of the public hearing, a clear violation of M.G.L., c.131,s.40.
The Order of Conditions shows filing date of NOI as October 22, 1996, instead of September 3, 1996.
The Order of Conditions was written by Humphrey Sutton, ex-chairman but not a member of HCC at that time.
The Order of Conditions were written prior to the meeting.
Proposed propane gas tank foundation and underground utility line were denied, despite the fact that HCC voted in favor of these two proposed activities at the public hearing on October 22, 1996.
Furthermore, the "Order of Conditions" states, "The Town electrical inspector has informed HCC that no application for any permit for any work has been received by him." This is a lie. Jim Foley, town selectmen, questioned the electrical inspector about the permit, and Blease confirmed, that he, in fact, had received plaintiff's electrical permit application but "never processed it."
This permit does not need to be issued in order to file a NOI and to get Orders of Conditions issued.
The Order of Conditions contains arbitrary and capricious statements concerning safety issues which are outside the scope of authority of the HCC.
December 27, 1996: Plaintiff's attorney is filing a request for Superseding Order of Conditions.
January 6, 1997: Plaintiff's attorney requests copies of minutes to the HCC meetings held during the months of October and November 1996, according to M.G.L., c.66,s.10.
January 10, 1997: Brian Harmon sends "plaintiff's answers to defendant's first set interrogatories" to Vincent McCaughey, attorney of the ZBA, on behalf of Peter Frei (plaintiff). This is part of civil action in Superior Court, docket number HDCV1996-71, (balcony of dwelling).
January 23, 1997: DEP denies Superseding Order of Conditions, by following the false arguments of HCC, and not entering the arguments provided by attorney Leiter, in clear violation of the law, (one of the DEP officers, Minth Tonthat, is a friend of former HCC chairman Humphrey Sutton).
February 5, 1997: Attorney Leiter is filing the "Notice of claim for adjudicatory appeal" on behalf of plaintiff on HCC's conduct in regards to the order of conditions on plaintiff's NOI with the DEP file number 184-118.
April 7, 1997: DEP Boston issues "Pre-hearing Conference Order." The Pre-Hearing Conference is scheduled for June 4, 1997.
May 7, 1997: Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Leiter, sends "Order for Pre-Hearing Conference" to HCC and DEP Springfield. All parties are ordered to attend a meeting to discuss and to try to resolve some or all issues prior to the Pre-Hearing Conference. This meeting is scheduled for May 13, 1997, at 8:00pm.
May 12, 1997: Plaintiff delivered by hand, letter from attorney Leiter to HCC member, Helen Kreiger. The letter confirms that HCC is postponing the ordered meeting scheduled for May 13.
Humphrey Sutton, who was responsible for writing the unlawful Order of conditions, conveniently planned a business trip to Europe for the week of May 13, 1997. Members of the HCC request the meeting to be postponed to May 20, and demand that Humphrey Sutton be present. Attorney Leiter also orders the tape recordings of the meetings to be made available, recordings of the meetings of October 1, 15, 22, and November 26, 1996.
May 15, 1997: Peter Frei (plaintiff) files "MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," in the Superior Court civil action, docket number HDCV1996-71, (balcony on dwelling).
May 20, 1997: Pre-Hearing Conference with HCC. Ex-chairman Humphrey Sutton was unable to attend. Humphrey Sutton suffered a severe asthma attack in a hotel in London, Great Britain, and died. Town Selectman Jim Foley attended the meeting together with plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney Bruce Leiter.
Brian Roche was still opposed to subsurface conduit. Finally, after attorney Bruce Leiter and plaintiff were asked by Jim Foley, town selectman, to step outside so they could discuss the matter in the absence of plaintiff and his attorney, all members of HCC agreed to accept the NOI in its entirety. HCC would issue an amended Order of Condition, allowing plaintiff the foundation of Propane Gas Tank and subsurface utility lines.
The recording of this meeting was erased by unknown.
May 27, 1997: Plaintiff's attorney files motion to continue the Pre-Hearing Conference with the Office of Administrative Appeals of the DEP, in anticipation of settlement.
May 28, 1997: Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Leiter, sends letter to plaintiff, informing him that Betsy Kimball, a DEP attorney with the Western Region Office, has no issue with plaintiff's anticipated work.
June 4, 1997: HCC is issuing amended Order of Conditions. Quote:

"The installation of power lines in the lake-bed and the foundation work for the propane tank are now allowed without reservation or precedent. All proper permits and inspections must be done."
June 17, 1997: Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Leiter, sends bill for filing the adjudicatory appeal of $1944.20.
June 24, 1997: Plaintiff's petition against the ZBA of Holland in Hampden Superior Court, docket number HDCV1996-71, brought relief. Judge Ford annulled the decision of the ZBA and granted plaintiff's summary judgment, and ordered that the matter be remanded to the ZBA for further consideration under the right section, c.40A,s.6.
Benjamin Haller, lawyer and chairman of ZBA, resigned before the adjudication of plaintiff's lawsuit.
August 5, 1997: Plaintiff files second petition for a special permit for a proposed 5' by 12' balcony with the ZBA.
August 11, 1997: Town clerk sends time stamped documents of petition back to plaintiff. The petition has been forwarded to the new chairman of ZBA, Robert Swift.
September 9, 1997: Public hearing with the ZBA on second petition on 5' by 12' balcony takes place. The board grants the special permit to build the proposed balcony.
September 11, 1997: ZBA sends letter with written decision, granting the special permit.
September 8, 1998: Building inspector issues building permit for proposed two-story garage. Signed copy of building permit application lists under item 28 and 29 that there will be plumbing in the two-story garage. Item 20 lists that the building will be heated. Item 22 lists no bedrooms.
July 12, 1999: Richard Cox reviews septic plan, adding the connection of the proposed two-story garage.
July 20, 1999: Plaintiff attends meeting with BOH and submits revised plans. this plans are the 8th sets of plans. The board wants to forward the plans to the town sanitarian, Mr. Quinn, for reviewing.
August 16, 1999: Mr. Quinn, BOH, sends letter by fax to Richard Cox instead of notifying plaintiff as required by statute, stating that the revised plans submitted by plaintiff on July 20, 1999 are unclear.
Plans are in conformance with all applicable provisions of 310 CMR 15.000. The request is arbitrary and capricious.
September 15, 1999: Forty-five day period in which the Board needs to act upon an application expires, board constructively granted permit for application, pursuant to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected interest in the approval of his 8th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system.
October 18, 1999: Plaintiff sends a registered letter to the BOH, informing them of the fact that they had constructively granted a permit, and requesting a signed copy of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan.
October 19, 1999: Plaintiff learns for the first time of the letter faxed by Mr. Quinn to Richard Cox on August 16., 1999.
November 15, 1999: Plaintiff sends registered letter to the BOH, informing the BOH that they failed to notify him within the 45-day period, pursuant to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, and also that notifying his engineer, Richard Cox, would fall short of their duty to notify the applicant as required under M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, since plaintiff is the applicant and not Richard Cox.
Plaintiff includes plan with the alteration of the system highlighted as requested by the BOH. This is the 9th set of plans.
December 31, 1999: Forty-five day period in which the Board needs to act upon an application expires for the second time on this application; thus, board constructively granted permit for application for the second time pursuant to M.G.L., c.111,s.31E.
February 14, 2000: Plaintiff sends one more registered letter to the BOH, reminding the BOH again of their duty under M.G.L., c.111,s.31E, and that he is still waiting.
February 28, 2000: Memo from A. Quinn to BOH. titled "Review of existing plans & files of plaintiff of Maybrook Road on file." This Memo gives testimony to the skillfully orchestrated scheme of harassment by Sally Blais and other members of the BOH, creating a mess they conveniently are trying to blame on plaintiff.
March 21, 2000: In an attempt to institute public awareness of Sally Blais's, chairman of BOH, scheme of harassment and discrimination, plaintiff was accompanied by two well recognized members of the community, Mrs. Patty Foley, wife of Jim Foley, town selectman at that time, and Mr. Edward Voloka. Sally Blais is making the following claims:
claims she asked plaintiff for an "as built plan" back in 1996; (said document was mailed to BOH by plaintiff's engineer on June 22, 1995); denied ever having received the document; (another copy of said document was mailed or handed to BOH after this meeting; it was then allegedly lost again, see entry of March 21, 2001, then allegedly lost in the fire of the town hall in December of 1995, see entry of April 3, 2001);
claims nobody ever inspected the installed system in 1995 before the trenches were back-filled. Therefor nobody would really know what is in the ground, the system will have to be dug out to be inspected; (plaintiff's engineer, Richard Cox, has an entry in his field book; according to the record, the system was inspected by Maria Scott; plaintiff also remembers it clearly, since the system had to be inspected twice; the first time, the distribution box was installed the wrong way by Glen Hitchcock, the installer; the distribution box was then turned around 180 degrees and reinspected by Maria Scott the following day; the same parties attended the second inspection);
claims that she just joined the Board in 1996, did not know any better, that's why she did not stop plaintiff back then......(connecting the two-story garage to the subsurface sewage disposal system), and should not have signed the procedure sheet (see entry September 3, 1996). She also handed plaintiff a copy of a memo from Mr. Quinn, addressed to the BOH. In that memo, Mr. Quinn, under item 11, mentions the fact that the Board failed to sign of and failed to issue a certificate of compliance.
There is no mention of a missing "as built plan."
Of course Mr. Quinn does not use the word "failed." In all the prior correspondence from Mr. Quinn, there is no mention of any outstanding documents from plaintiff's side.
Under item 16, Mr. Quinn claims that the BOH is still waiting for "resubmission" when in fact plaintiff resubmitted plans as requested, by certified mail and return receipt, on November 15, 1999. Sally Blais turned every thing around; in an accusatory, capricious way, she puts the blame on plaintiff. The purpose of the memo written by Mr. Quinn is unclear to plaintiff. Taken out of context, the memo leaves a negative impression; almost every item has some negative comment:

item 1: "no perk rate noted"

item 8: "pumping prior to the septic tank is denied"

item 9: ."..that it had denied the approval of the subsurface sewage disposal system.."

item 11: "Certificate of Compliance not completed or signed off"

item 12: "which is completely unacceptable to any board...."

item 14: "The only way to determine that it was revised four times is by the four different dates on the plan. There is no way to determine what was done when, except to decipher the remarks of each revision."

item 16: "we are still awaiting this resubmission."
The meeting ended after Sally Blais asked plaintiff, "Are you telling me I am not doing my job ?" Plaintiff answered: "Yes." Thereafter, Sally Blais, chairman of the BOH, stormed out of the office. She did not return.
March 26, 2000: Letter from plaintiff to Richard Cox, informing Mr. Cox of his intention to attend the BOH meeting on April 4, 2000, and also sending him some copies of correspondence.
March 28, 2000: Richard Cox resubmits plans for the third time, with letter to Mr. Quinn. Mr. Cox references 310 CMR, s.15.301(5), which provides language that the proposed hook-up of the proposed garage is in accordance with title 5.
April 4, 2000: Plaintiff resubmits septic plans, and also files another copy of the allegedly never filed "as built" dated June 22, 1995. This is the 10th set of plans.
April 18, 2000: Mr. Quinn outlines his opinion in a letter, ignoring the provisions outlined in 310 CMR 15.00. Mr. Quinn states:

"If calculations can show that the existing leach field has the capacity to accommodate this new structure (per the 1995 code), then the system can be approved)."
Formula to calculate system sewage flow has "number of bedrooms" as multiplier. As there were no additional bedrooms in the proposed garage, the flow according to 310 CMR 15.203 is unchanged and will not increase.
The same board signed the procedure sheet, see entry of September 3, 1996, agreeing to the hook-up of plaintiff's two-story garage, thus allowing the issuing of a building permit by the building inspector, for a building with plumbing.
May 1, 2000: Letter from Richard Cox, plaintiff's engineer, to Mr. Quinn, quoting the CMR again.
May 16, 2000: In an attempt of good faith, plaintiff files an affidavit with the registry of deeds, restricting the number of bedrooms on the property to two. 310 CMR 15.203(2) and 310 CMR 15.002 allows such a restrictive provision.
This is not a request of the BOH or a legal necessity, plaintiff volunteers to file such a document, in an additional attempt to find a solution and to offer members of the BOH a way to end the scheme of harassment and discrimination, without "losing face."
May 16, 2000: Plaintiff attends a meeting which is not really a meeting (no quorum); nobody else but Sally Blais is present. Plaintiff hands a copy of the affidavit plaintiff filed with the Registry of Deeds to Sally Blais. Sally Blais is insulting plaintiff, calling him a liar, questioning the authenticity of the copy of the document, and requesting to see a receipt. Prepared, plaintiff handed her a copy of the receipt. Then, Sally Blais explained that the receipt would only prove that plaintiff filed "something" which could be any thing.
June 12, 2000: Registry of Deeds sends original of Affidavit back to plaintiff with the book number 11195 and the page number 378 of said record.
June 19, 2000: Plaintiff sends a five page letter to the Board of selectmen, informing the members of said board of the ssituation with the BOH. The letter ends with the paragraph:

"Over the last 13 years I spent over $18,000.00 and countless hours on capricious and malicious escapades of town officials, especially Humphrey Sutton, to get what the law allows me to have, it has to end, it has to end now, enough is enough!!!"
June 30, 2000: Selectman Jim Foley attends BOH meeting and discussed plaintiff's outstanding "Disposal System Construction Permit." In this document (minutes of meeting), the "Disposal System Construction Permit" is incorrectly called "Letter of Compliance."
The minutes also state that Sally Blais requested from plaintiff the deed restriction, when in fact plaintiff filed this restriction on his own initiative and without prior knowledge by Sally Blais.
July 18, 2000: Plaintiff attends BOH meeting to obtain the outstanding "Certificate of Compliance" for the work done permitted under "Disposal Work Installer's Permit" which should have been a "Disposal System Construction Permit" number 040495, which was actually a date, April 4, 1995, and not a number, (changing a tight tank to a septic tank, addition of a leach field), and to obtain the "Disposal System Construction Permit" the Board approved by taking a vote, during the previous meeting of June 30, 2000.
The two members present told plaintiff, he should just go ahead and do it......, plaintiff would not need a paper (Disposal System Construction Permit), only installers would need a permit! Plaintiff insisted and explained to the members of the Board the difference between a "Disposal Work Installers permit" and a "Disposal System Construction permit." Plaintiff also showed the members of the Board the section 15.020 of 310 CMR, of his copy of 310 CMR 15.000 he brought to the meeting. Only then, one of the Board members telephoned Mr. Quinn, town sanitarian, and asked him what to do.
Finally, the two members present tried to find a blank copy of the document to be issued. After a while, one of the Board members found a form for the town of Sturbridge and filled it out.
Plaintiff's request for the above mentioned outstanding "Certificate of Compliance" was not granted at all, with the explanation that the BOH would issue a "Certificate of Compliance" for both applications as soon as the construction was finished and the final inspection done. Plaintiff insisted and again informed the present board members of his rights and the Board's duty pursuant to 310 CMR 15.021(3), but plaintiff's efforts were not rewarded, and the duty of the Board ignored.
October 2, 2000: Plaintiff sends a certified letter with the completed attachment "Installer's & Engineer's statement of compliance sign off form" to the BOH, with the request to send him the "certificate of compliance" for which plaintiff enclosed a self-addressed and stamped envelope.
October 31, 2000: The BOH issues faulty "Certificate of Compliance." There is a place on said form where the application number needs to be filled in. By doing so, the document is securely bound to the application that the "Certificate of Compliance" is referring to. The BOH failed to make that simple entry on the form, the document is vague and unclear. The document bears the following notes in hand writing: "Garage only" and "(Hookup)."
Sally Blais, chairman BOH, used a missing "Certificate of Compliance" as an excuse to delay reviewing plaintiff's application to connect the two-story garage for almost a year.
December 19, 2000: Plaintiff made a second attempt to get a "Certificate of Compliance" during a regular meeting with the BOH. During this meeting, Sally Blais responded to plaintiff's request for the still outstanding Certificate of Compliance:

"you would like me to change that, wouldn't you?..I bet you would!!..."
Sally Blais was referring to the certificate of compliance this board issued on October 31, 2000, for the alteration granted with permit number 071800-3 (connecting the garage to the existing subsurface sewage disposal system). She explained that she wrote the remark "For Garage only" on the "Certificate of Compliance" to make sure plaintiff would not change the garage into another dwelling. Plaintiff responded with disbelief and said that this would not make any sense, and the remark on the "Certificate of Compliance" would be very explicit and would also contain the remark "(Hookup)," and that there was no mentioning of a leach field or a change from a tight tank to a septic tank. Sally Blais than said to plaintiff, quote:

"nothing makes sense to you!."
As the meeting did not meet the requirement for a quorum, there is no record of this incident. There are no minutes of this meeting either.
March 20, 2001: Plaintiff and his friend, Dave Chambers, attend another meeting with the BOH. Plaintiff is asking again for the outstanding "Certificate of Compliance." Sally Blais first responded, quote:
"Peter, I'm glad to do that for you."
She could not find the "as built" plan in her file, (the document she claimed she never got during the meeting which took place on March 21, 2000; another copy was then mailed or handed to her after that meeting. In her letter dated April 3, 2001, Sally Blais claims that the original of the "as built" was lost during a fire in December of 1995, in which the town hall was destroyed. After a while, Sally Blais gave up searching for the "as built" and she said, "without that 'as built' I can not help you!"
Plaintiff expected that she would find a way to hinder the issuance of the document again. Plaintiff handed a copy of a three page letter, dated March 19, 2001, he had prepared for this expected outcome, to each member of the Board, before leaving the meeting.
This letter from plaintiff addressed to the BOH, requested again the issuance of the required "Certificate of Compliance," which Sally Blais and other members of the Board failed to issue, and which has been due since 1995.
April 3, 2001: Letter from Sally Blais, chairman BOH. Again she refuses to issue "Certificate of Compliance" and fails to take responsibility for the failure of the Board to issue such document Instead, she blames plaintiff and his engineer Richard Cox for the situation. Sally Blais accuses plaintiff of "not following the rules and regulations of Title V CMR 15.00 and the Bylaws of the Town of Holland until this Board required you to do so." Sally Blais further claims in that letter, "As of today 4/3/01, I am still waiting for a ruling from DEP and Town Council." Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in such "Certificate of Compliance."
February 19, 2002: PBH adopts unconstitutional policy for process of decision finding, which is also in violation of M.G.L. statutes. Minutes to the meeting of this day provide scienter-type evidence of such custom by the PBH officials having final policy-making authority.
April 15, 2002: Plaintiff signs contract "EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL LISTING AGREEMENT," with Sullivan & Wallace Real Estate, to sell lot "A" for the price or $ 100,000.
April 19, 2002: Robert Mildish and Tami Hayward-Mildish signed contract "OFFER TO PURCHASE AGREEMENT" on this day and therefore expressed their commitment to purchase lot "A" of plaintiff's 1st ANR plan for the price of $ 100,000.
May 7, 2002: Plaintiff, owner, and Rob and Tami Mildish, buyers of lot A, attended first informal meeting in regards to plaintiff's 1st ANR plan for a subdivision.
This voluntary participation of an informal meeting is not required and was a good faith attempt by the plaintiff and the buyers of said lot A to approach the PBH members with goodwill and benevolence.
Members of the Board, led by Earl Johnson, claimed that plaintiff would not be able to subdivide his parcel because he owned an adjoining nonconforming lot;
claimed that the nonconforming lot would have to have 200 feet frontage allotted along Maybrook Road;
plaintiff's property would not have a road with any legal standing and would be no more than a "driveway."
Earl Johnson, member of the Board and selectman, suggested that plaintiff should donate the property to the town to avoid paying taxes, as plaintiff would not be able to subdivide the property anyway.
The only way plaintiff could legally do it would be by constructing a road in compliance with the subdivision control bylaw of the town.
Such a road would have to be 24 feet wide (pavement) with a circle at the end with a diameter of 100 feet.
This road would be approximately 850 feet long and serve 3 dwellings, two of which already exist.
As the parcel of land is peninsular, there would never be additional development or more traffic.
This 24' road serving three (3) dwellings would lead into Maybrook Road which is the only access road to serve dwellings on the west side of Hamilton Reservoir, approximately 280 dwellings. The pavement of Maybrook road is 14' to 16' wide.
May 7, 2002: Plaintiff showed to the attending members of the PBH a copy of a map titled, "Town of Holland Board of Assessors Map numbered R 40." The actual subdivision plan was not drawn yet. Plaintiff altered said map, to show the approximate property lines of proposed Lot A.
Defendant(s) raised issues and asserted facts which did not have any base in law or equity. From the beginning, the Board members' conduct showed clearly a discriminatory animus against the plaintiff and his ANR subdivision.
May 21, 2002: Plaintiff, owner, and Rob and Tami Mildish, buyers, attended second informal meeting. Plaintiff handed each member of the PBH, defendant(s), a copy of a document consisting of 8 pages of case law, addressing issues brought up by the defendant(s) during the first meeting, the meeting of May 7.
In another ill motivated attempt to sabotage and squash plaintiffs 1st ANR plan application, and consistent with other actions by the PBH members, PBH members handed a document to plaintiff with a list of four (4) case notes that the members of the Board claimed would apply to plaintiff's parcel.
Three cases deal with issues like wetland and do not apply at all, the Board members emphasized on the remaining note on the case, Gallitano v. Board of Survey & Planning of Waltham, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 269 (1980), which provides:

"[a]s a rule of thumb, practical access exists where the buildable portion of each lot is connected to the required frontage by a strip of land not narrower than the required frontage at any point, measured from that point to the nearest point of the opposite sideline."
The required frontage in Waltham at that time was 20 feet, in Holland where plaintiff's parcel is located, the required frontage is 10 times more, that is, two hundred (200) feet.
Gallitano obviously supports plaintiff's 1st and 2nd ANR plan.
The introduction of this document is a deliberate discriminatory arbitrary act geared towards squashing plaintiff's 1st ANR.
The Gallitano case offers by its description no assistance to the defendants; to the contrary, the case supports an endorsement of plaintiff's 1st and 2nd ANR plan.
During a deposition of Debra Benveniste, plaintiff established the fact that Debra Benveniste never read the case. Debra Benveniste and Earl Johnson and other members in furtherance of the conspiracy, guided by animus, introduced this document into the proceeding to actively sabotage plaintiff's 1st ANR plan with the intent to retaliate, harass and discriminate.
June 4, 2002: Plaintiff, Rob and Tami Mildish, buyers, attempted to file a copy of plaintiff's formal application for his 1st ANR plan with Robert H. Ford, town clerk, pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81T.
In violation of M.G.L., c.41,s.81T, the town clerk refused to accept plaintiff's 1.ANR with the comment:

"I don't want to get involved!."
Plaintiff showed town clerk page 17-16, paragraph 17.24, Massachusetts Zoning Manual, Volume II, edited by Martin R. Healy, MCLE Book series, describing the procedure for securing a 81P endorsement. Mr. Ford stood firm and still refused.
This refusal by Robert Ford, town clerk, delayed the application by fourteen (14) days and was improper and a denial of "procedural and substantive due process." The scheduled meeting of the PBH for this date was canceled without prior notice.
June 18, 2002: Plaintiff and Rob and Tami Mildish, buyers, attended the third meeting and handed Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, document "Memorandum in support of request for endorsement of ANR plan under G.L.c.41,s.81P," with attachments consisting of 19 (nineteen) pages and 1 (one) set of color prints, addressing issues brought up by the defendant(s) during the meeting of May 21, 2002.
The defendant(s) then brought up old issues again. Plaintiff submitted formal application of his 1st ANR plan, titled "Plan of land in Holland, Mass. prepared for plaintiff, owner," dated June 3, 2002, seeking endorsement and certification pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81X.
Minutes to the PBH meeting of this day include the record that members of the Board will discuss plaintiff's 1st ANR plan with the town attorney, Vincent McCaughey.
Members of the Board did not take any action during the meeting and asked plaintiff to come back for the next regular meeting.
June 18, 2002: Plaintiff's 1st ANR plan, as submitted to the Board on this day, was in compliance with all applicable requirements and regulations, such as M.G.L. and Zoning By-laws of the town of Holland.
Members of the PBH had no discretion in deciding plaintiff's application.
Endorsement of plaintiff's 1st ANR plan by the PBH was mandatory according to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the endorsement of his 1st ANR plan.
June 22, 2002: Two juveniles break into a vacant summer cottage and a storage shed on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff witnessed one of the juveniles throwing a brick through a window. Plaintiff calls 911 with his cell phone, holding on to one of the juveniles. Kevin Gleason, at that time a police officer of the Holland police department, now Chief of police in Holland, one other officer of the Holland police department and two police officers of the Brimfield Police department arrested the two juveniles after they confessed that they broke the lock to a shed and burglarized the shed and the house, located on plaintiff's property, looking for "usable stuff."
June 24, 2002: Debra Benveniste wrote letter denying plaintiff's 1st ANR plan application of his parcel, deed book 7120, page 529, without prior "final action" by the PBH members, in violation of the open meeting law M.G.L., c.39,s.23B, and provisions of M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
June 25, 2002: Plaintiff files four page "voluntary statement" with the Holland Police and presses criminal charges for trespassing, breaking in and entering (two counts, house and shed), theft, damaging and destroying of property against both juvenile suspects.
Sometime before July 2, 2002: Without notifying the plaintiff, the members of the PBH conducted a visual inspection of the private way on plaintiff's property mentioned in the minutes to the meeting of July 2, 2002, and also in the testimony of Debra Benveniste during her deposition of October 16, 2003. This constitutes a violation of due process.
July 2, 2002: Plaintiff, owner, and Rob and Tami Mildish, buyers, are attending the fourth meeting with the PBH.
Without taking a formal vote during the meeting, (final action), the defendant(s) inform plaintiff of their illegal and preordained decision, i.e., refusing plaintiff's 1st ANR plan application.
This constitutes violation of M.G.L., c.41,s.81P, and M.G.L., c.39,s.23B. The members of the planning board imposed conditions not authorized by M.G.L. and local ordinance to plaintiff's 1st ANR plan; such as the condition of a private way which is located on said parcel of land, and does not need to provide any frontage to the newly created lot, lot A; such as topographical condition which is located outside the newly created lot (condition is incorrectly stated), violation of M.G.L., c.41,s.81Q; such as further development outside newly created lot.
Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest in the endorsement of his 1st ANR subdivision plan application.
Plaintiff's 1st ANR plan is in compliance with all applicable statutes of M.G.L., local bylaws, regulations and requirements, and this entitlement amounts to a constitutionally protected property interest granted under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
The minutes to the meeting give testimony to the capricious arbitrary arguments the PBH based its decision on:

"We believe that the division would make a nonconforming lot more nonconforming."

There is nothing "nonconforming" about the lot, and the 1st ANR plan would not change this fact!
Further:

"What Mr. Frei refers to as a private road appears on visual inspection to be more of a very poorly maintained driveway. This is the only access to the public way, Maybrook Road."

The lot created by plaintiff's 1st ANR plan, (lot A), has more than 200 feet of frontage along Maybrook Road and does not depend on or use the private way mentioned in the minutes. Testimony to this fact was given reluctantly by Earl Johnson, member of the PBH, during his deposition on December 30, 2002, when he admitted that the private way had nothing to do with the newly created lot A, and lot A did not depend on any frontage along said private way.
Further:

"At points, the property measures approximately 10 feet wide with steep drop offs to Hamilton Reservoir which we consider to be an extreme topographical condition impeding access to the buildable portion of one of the lots."

The narrowest point of said property, and there is only one, measures more then 60 feet. The lot referred to as the "buildable portion" is already improved and has a dwelling. The narrow spot the minutes refer to is located outside the newly created lot A.
Further:

"The buildable portion of the rear lot consists of several areas and the Board was concerned that if an ANR were approved, more development would occur which would further impede access to the public way."

This is another ludicrous claim. The alleged concern is outside the Board's authority. Plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan with the final subdivision of plaintiff's property, which is a peninsula, created only one additional building lot, there is no more land to divide on said peninsula, and there will never be more for the foreseeable future (until the next ice age).
Despite plaintiff's request and plaintiff informing defendant(s) of their statutory obligation to mail a written notification of the Board's final action, defendant(s) refused to mail a written notice of it's decision to the plaintiff, as required pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Earl Johnson made a comment to the fact that the Board would not mail such document and stated that the Board would mention the decision in the minutes of the meeting.
During his deposition in Superior Court, Earl Johnson committed perjury. He testified under oath, in the presence of his counsel Vincent McCaughey, that the Board mailed plaintiff a copy of the Board's decision, see entry December 30, 2002.
Debra Benveniste stated in a letter dated December 22, 2003, that the Board did not mail such notification to the plaintiff on the Board's decision on plaintiff's 1st ANR plan, only on plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan.
Town counsel Vincent McCaughey knew, or should have known that plaintiff's 1st ANR was in compliance with all applicable requirements and regulations, such as M.G.L. and zoning bylaws of the town of Holland, and that the members of the PBH had no discretion in deciding plaintiff's application, and that endorsement of plaintiff's 1st ANR plan by the PBH was mandatory according to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Despite his involvement as legal advisor, Vincent McCaughey, in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy did nothing to prevent the commission of the wrongs and therefore violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37 and M.G.L., c.221,s.38.
July 15, 2002: Plaintiff went to town hall and requested copy of Minutes to PBH meeting of July 2, 2002. The town clerk could not produce a copy. The most recent copy of the minutes on file were the minutes to the meeting of April 2, 2002.
July 23, 2002: The PBH failed to take final action and failed to give written notice of its decision to the plaintiff within the 21 day period, statutory requirements pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Plaintiff planed to subdivide said parcel into three lots from the beginning. Plaintiff's surveyor was unable to survey the entire lot prior to June 4, 2002, and produced an ANR plan with a partial subdivision showing only one newly created lot, lot A. Plaintiff decided to submit ANR plan with just one newly created lot, lot A, on June 4., 2002, which was his 1st ANR plan.
Realizing that the defendant(s) would have to be sued by the plaintiff in order to obey the law and respect plaintiff's rights , plaintiff subsequently filed a second application for an ANR subdivision plan with the final subdivision dividing said property into three lots, lot B, already improved and built upon, and two additional building lots, lot A and lot C. This 2nd ANR is marked as "Plan of land in Holland, Mass. prepared for plaintiff, owner," dated October 14, 2002.
October 14, 2002: Plaintiff's surveyor finally finishes plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan.
October 15, 2002: Plaintiff submitted, during a regular meeting of the Planning Board, his 2nd ANR plan, titled: "PLAN OF LAND IN HOLLAND, MA, PREPARED FOR PETER FREI (owner), together with attachment "FORM A."
In a "good faith" attempt and not out of a legal necessity, plaintiff proposed to make the preexisting nonconforming adjoining lot a conforming lot by adding approximately 530 feet of frontage along the private way and Maybrook Road to the 164 feet of existing frontage and 33,811 square feet to the 28,950 existing square feet (adding parcel 1 and parcel 2, to book 6519, page 178, as outlined in "FORM A"), proposing to widen the private way from 12 feet to 18 feet, and to straighten and to level the private way.
Plaintiff's plan sought endorsement and certification for the creation of three (3) lots on Hamilton Reservoir.
Plaintiff's plan did not create a subdivision pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P, requiring approval by the PBH.
Plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan as submitted to the PBH is in compliance with all applicable requirements and regulations, under M.G.L. and zoning bylaws of the town of Holland.
Members of the PBH had no discretion in endorsing plaintiff's 2nd ANR application. Endorsement of plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan by the PBH was ministerial act and mandatory according to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the endorsement of his 2, ANR plan.
October 17, 2002: Plaintiff filed a written notice with the town clerk on submission of said plan pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81T.
November 7, 2002: Contrary to the provisions of M.G.L., c.41,s.81P, the Board failed to act upon plaintiff's submission within 21 days. M.G.L., c.41,s.81P requires that endorsement be entered "forthwith" by the PBH if plan does not involve a subdivision.
November 7, 2002: By the PBH's inaction, plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan becomes constructively endorsed according to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
PBH failed to take a vote (final action) and failed to send plaintiff "written notice of its determination," two statutory requirements pursuant to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
November 19, 2002: Plaintiff, accompanied by three witnesses, asked the town clerk if he had any decision filed from the PBH on his 2nd ANR plan.
Town clerk was unable to produce any documents and stated that he did not have anything on file on plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan. Afterwards, plaintiff attended the PBH meeting and Debra Benveniste was able to produce a copy of the PBH's written determination on plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan.
The members of the PBH inform plaintiff that the Board refused to endorse his 2nd ANR plan.
Plaintiff informs the Board, that he will file a lawsuit in Superior Court against the Board, since the Board failed to take "final action," failed to follow proper procedures, and also failed to notify plaintiff by mailing a written notice of the Board's determination. These are statutory requirements under M.G.L., c.41,s.81P and requirements of the open meeting law M.G.L., c.39,s.23B.
November 19, 2002: On or after this day, members of the PBH fraudulently falsify the official record (minutes) to the meeting of October 16, 2002. Members of the Board crossed out by hand the words "will deny" and added "voted to deny" by hand.
With this unlawful act, the members of the PBH falsified the record to reflect the taking of a vote (final action) on plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan, which in reality never took place. This act by the members of the PBH is a malicious and deliberate violation of M.G.L., c.268,s.6A, and the open meeting law, M.G.L., c.39,s.23B, and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Town counsel, Vincent McCaughey, knew or should have known, that plaintiff's 2nd ANR was in compliance with all applicable requirements and regulations, such as M.G.L. and zoning bylaws of the town of Holland, and that the members of the PBH had no discretion in deciding plaintiff's application, and that endorsement of plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan by the PBH was mandatory according to M.G.L., c.41,s.81P. Despite his involvement as legal consultant, Vincent McCaughey, in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy, did nothing to prevent the commission of the wrongs and therefore violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
November 20, 2002: In compliance with Mass.R.civ.P., Rule 4, plaintiff had Summons with complaint served to the defendant(s), the Planning Board of the town of Holland and the town of Holland, for a petition for an order in mandamus.
On the same day, plaintiff drove to Springfield to file his complaint with the Superior Court, docket number HDCV2002-1196. On his way to the Superior Court, plaintiff passed a cruiser of the Holland Police. A Police officer was outside his cruiser talking to someone. Plaintiff passed cruiser driving at a speed not exceeding the posted speed limit. In furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy, said Police officer, acting in concert with Kevin Gleason, Earl Johnson, and possibly other town officials, chased after plaintiff with his emergency lights on, stopped plaintiff, and issued an unjustified ticket, alleging that plaintiff was driving at a speed of 52 miles an hour and then issuing a ticket claiming a speed of 42 miles an hour, instead of the posted 30 miles an hour.
This action constitutes intimidation of a witness, conspiracy to obstruct justice, retaliatory discrimination for exercising his constitutional rights granted under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1.
Plaintiff contested the unjustified citation for speeding, which was thrown out as "ridiculous" during a hearing before Mr. Riddle, Magistrate of the Palmer district court, on April 1, 2003.
November 21, 2002: Defendant Debra Benveniste mailed plaintiff letter, "notice of decision," one day after plaintiff served Summons with complaint to the PBH, defendant(s).
This document was mailed 36 days after plaintiff submitted his 2nd ANR plan, and not within the 21 day period as mandated by M.G.L., c.41,s.81P.
Plaintiff had a buyer for one of said lots, lot A, and was unable to sell same due to the failure of the Defendant(s) to properly act upon his submission of his plan.
December 10, 2002: Notice of deposition of three members of the PBH.
December 16, 2002: Answer of the defendant and counterclaim.
December 17, 2002: Filing of plaintiff's request for entry of default.
December 18, 2002: Letter from Vincent McCaughey, attorney of defendant(s), containing misleading manipulative statements stating facts about a phone conversation between plaintiff and Vincent McCaughey that were incorrect.
December 19, 2002: Letter from plaintiff to Vincent McCaughey, attorney of defendant(s), setting the record straight.
December 30, 2002: Plaintiff deposes Joanne May and Earl Johnson Debra Benveniste ignores the notice. At a deposition, she testified that she had to work that day.
Deponent Earl Johnson, member of the PBH and town selectman, and represented by counsel Vincent McCaughey, committed perjury when he testified under oath. Quoting Mr. Johnson:

"But in essence, Mr. Frei we denied your project (1st ANR plan) back in July and sent you a letter to that effect,"
Compliance or noncompliance of the notification requirement, mandated under M.G.L., c.41,s.81P, is a material matter in this case.
Earl Johnson, in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy between Debra Benveniste, himself, and other town officials, testified falsely to a material matter which he did believe not to be true and testified that the PBH sent plaintiff a letter denying plaintiff's 1st ANR plan, whereas in truth and in fact, the defendant, then and there, well knew that the PBH failed to notify plaintiff, and that he was swearing falsely in violation of M.G.L., c.268,s.1.
Debra Benveniste admitted in a letter, dated December 22, 2003, that the PBH failed to comply with the mandatory notification requirement and failed to mail such document on plaintiff's 1st ANR plan.
Interestingly, Earl Johnson was not even questioned to this fact; Earl Johnson volunteered this information, and willfully and knowingly committed perjury.
This deposition took place at the offices of Catuogno Court Reporting Services, One Monarch Place, 1414 Main Street, Springfield Massachusetts, at 9:30 a.m.
January 21, 2003: According to the minutes of the PBH meeting on this date, defendant Debra Benveniste, chairman of the PBH, allegedly placed a "no trespassing order" against plaintiff because plaintiff asked town clerk for her address.
As defendant Debra Benveniste failed to follow the notification requesting her attendance of the deposition scheduled for December 30, 2002, plaintiff needed Benveniste's address to serve her a subpoena for the rescheduled deposition.
January 28, 2003: Plaintiff inquires with the Holland Police about the break-in of June 22, 2002, since he has not heard any thing from the court and he is unable to get restitution for the damage done by the suspects. Kevin Gleason, now Chief of Police, explained to plaintiff, that it would not be unusual if plaintiff did not hear any thing from the court. A lot of times, suspects would enter a plea-bargain or the case would get thrown out without notification or involvement of the victim.
No attempt was made by the chief of police to find out why plaintiff had not heard anything or if the two juveniles were arraigned or charged.
Plaintiff claims that Kevin Gleason deliberately failed to forward the papers and failed to file them with the court.
Kevin Gleason conspired with Sally Blais, Earl Johnson, and maybe other town officials against plaintiff.
March 10, 2003: On his way home, plaintiff was followed by Holland Police, in a marked police cruiser, crossing the state line into Connecticut. As plaintiff pulls over to the left side at the entrance to a sand pit off of Gilbronson Road, (Connecticut) and stops his car, the officer in the marked cruiser stops his cruiser and blinds plaintiff with his search light for no reason. The Holland Police Department does not have any jurisdiction in the state of Connecticut. The officer finally drove off without any further actions. This was an attempt to intimidate plaintiff.
March 14, 2003: Kevin Gleason explained to plaintiff that he allegedly filed the papers in juvenile court in Springfield. Kevin also explained, that he would be more than glad to re-file the papers in case they could not find the copy he (allegedly) filed in Springfield with the juvenile court on June 24, 2002.
March 19, 2003: Plaintiff talks to Assistant District Attorney, Richard Morse, at the Superior Court House in Springfield. Plaintiff suspects that Kevin Gleason, chief of police, never forwarded papers on the "break-in" of his cottage due to discriminatory animus.
Kevin Gleason did get his job as Chief of Police in Holland, because one of the Selectmen, Earl Johnson, made it possible. Earl Johnson is also a member of the PBH.
Richard Morse's investigation into the matter revealed that there was no indication to confirm that Kevin Gleason ever filed the papers regarding the break-in with the court as stated, or that the two juveniles were ever charged.
April 7, 2003: Vincent McCaughey, in his "DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT," states:

"It is apparent that the Plaintiff was aware of the time frame in his failure to appeal by a subsequent filing of an "ANR" plan in October of 2002. The refusal of the Planning Board of the Town of Holland to endorse that plan is currently before this Court."
Vincent McCaughey knew, or should have known, that plaintiff filed his 2nd ANR to have his parcel subdivided into 3 lots. Plaintiff's 1st ANR subdivided his parcel into 2 lots.
In order to deceive the court, Vincent McCaughey made wrong statements of facts.
August 21, 2003: Vincent McCaughey produces documents requested by plaintiff per discovery order. Plaintiff requested, among other documents, copies of all ANR plan applications submitted since May 1, 1997.
All of the submitted ANR plans but plaintiff's ANR plan were accepted and endorsed by the PBH.
One of the ANR plans was accepted despite the fact that it did not comply with the frontage requirements.
September 11, 2003: During a deposition in which plaintiff deposed Debra Benveniste, Vincent McCaughey interfered in an attempt to intimidate plaintiff and hinder plaintiff from deposing Debra Benveniste. Vincent McCaughey repeatedly objected to plaintiff's questions. Plaintiff asked him for the basis of his repeated and interfering objections; Mr. McCaughey's answer was, quote:

"It's a leading question,"

plaintiff:

"I have a right to lead,"

Vincent McCaughey:

"You do not have a right to lead. Mr. Frei, I am not going to debate the issue,"

plaintiff:

"It is an issue. I just want to have it on the record...."
Plaintiff then informed Mr. McCaughey that plaintiff is aware of Mass. Rules of Civ. P. rule 43(b), after which Mr. McCaughey stopped interfering.
Mr. McCaughey knew, or should have known, that plaintiff has the right to examine Debra Benveniste, defendant, by leading questions.
September 12, 2003: Plaintiff notified Robert Ford, former town clerk, in a timely fashion, of a deposition scheduled for this day, in which plaintiff was going to depose Robert Ford.
Robert Ford had moved to Connecticut and refused to accept certified letter containing notice at his new address.
Robert Ford did not attend the deposition.
October 16, 2003: During a deposition of Debra Benveniste, chairman of the PBH, Debra Benveniste under oath swore that she would testify truly, did willfully testify falsely to a material matter which she did not believe to be true, to wit: the defendant testified that the members of the PBH voted on plaintiff's 1st ANR plan during the regular meeting of July 2, 2002, when in fact, the members of the PBH did not take a vote during that meeting, (final action).
To utter Debra Benveniste's perjury, plaintiff handed her document "written notice of decision," which the PBH is mandated to mail the applicant, (plaintiff). Plaintiff then asked Debra Benveniste to identify the document. Debra Benveniste identified the document, testified that she wrote the document, and that she signed the document.
This document "written notice of decision" is dated June 24, 2002, handwritten and signed by Debra Benveniste one week prior to the alleged vote that was allegedly taken during the meeting of July 2, 2002. This document is also time stamped by the town clerk on June 24, 2002.
Debra Benveniste, defendant, in truth and in fact, then and there well knew that the members of the PBH did not take a vote on plaintiff's 1st ANR plan during the meeting on July 2, 2002, (final action), and that Debra Benveniste was swearing falsely in violation of M.G.L., c.268,s.1 and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Debra Benveniste was represented by counsel, Vincent McCaughey, who was present at all times during this deposition which took place at the offices of Catuogno Court Reporting Services, One Monarch Place, 1414 Main Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, at 9:00 a.m. Perjured testimony was in regards to a material issue in the Superior Court case, docket number HDCV2002-1196.
October 16, 2003: During the same deposition of Debra Benveniste, chairman of the PBH, Debra Benveniste under oath swore that she would testify truly, did willfully testify falsely to a material matter which she did not believe to be true, to wit: the defendant testified, that the members of the PBH mailed a "written notification" on the PBH's decision on plaintiff's 1st ANR plan application to plaintiff, when in fact Debra Benveniste, in truth and in fact, then and there, well knew that the members of the PBH failed to mail said document "written notification" to plaintiff, and that Debra Benveniste was swearing falsely in violation of M.G.L., c.268,s.1, and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Debra Benveniste was represented by counsel, Vincent McCaughey, who was present at all times during this deposition which took place at the offices of Catuogno Court Reporting Services, One Monarch Place, 1414 Main Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, at 9:00 a.m. Perjured testimony was in regards to a material issue in the Superior Court case, docket number HDCV2002-1196.
October 16, 2003: During the same deposition of Debra Benveniste, chairman of the PBH, Debra Benveniste under oath swore that she would testify truly, did willfully testify falsely to a material matter which she did not believe to be true, to wit: the defendant testified that plaintiff was present during the alleged taking of the vote by the PBH, when in fact Debra Benveniste, in truth and in fact, then and there, well knew that plaintiff could not have been present, as the PBH never took a vote, and that Debra Benveniste was swearing falsely in violation of M.G.L., c.268,s.1, and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Debra Benveniste was represented by counsel, Vincent McCaughey, who was present at all times during this deposition which took place at the offices of Catuogno Court Reporting Services, One Monarch Place, 1414 Main Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, at 9:00 a.m. Perjured testimony was in regards to a material issue in the Superior Court case, docket number HDCV2002-1196.
December 29, 2003: In the JOINT PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM, Mr. McCaughey deliberately stated facts wrong, known to him to be false. He stated, quote:

"This case has been pleaded by the plaintiff as an appeal of the denial of an ANR plan yet he is seeking damages for said denial."
Counsel McCaughey is under "continuous obligation" to inform himself about the facts of the case. Vincent McCaughey, by making this false statement and others, violated M.G.L., c.221,s.38, M.G.L., c.265,s.37; and engaged in unethical conduct in violation of MA R S CT RULE 3:07 (rule 3.3, rule 3.4).
Plaintiff pleaded under COUNT I:

Defendant(s) failed to execute their non-discretionary duty and therefore constructively endorsed plan as "no approval required plan,"

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully demands that judgment be entered in his favor and against the defendant(s);

that the court issues an order of Mandamus against the Defendant(s), and that the court compels the Defendant(s) to endorse plan submitted by Plaintiff without any further delay, and that Defendant(s) issue required certificate;
Plaintiff never pleaded to be aggrieved by the decision of the PBH, instead, Plaintiff claimed that failure of the PBH to take final action concerning 2nd ANR plan within required time resulted in endorsement being deemed granted.
Plaintiff suggested to defendant(s) attorney during preparation of the joint pre trial hearing in the Superior Court case, docket number HDCV2002-1196, to waive the protection of the best evidence rule. Defendant(s) attorney declined and insisted to invoke the protection.
December 16, 2003: To obtain authenticated and certified copies of needed minutes and other documents, plaintiff together with a witness attended the open meeting with the PBH on this day.
Despite the fact that the needed members attended the meeting, Debra Benveniste, chairman, and Joanne May, clerk; Debra Benveniste said, quote: "I'm in a meeting. I don't have time for that," and "I want to talk to Vincent McCaughey before I give you anything." Plaintiff showed her copy of rule 44 of the Mass. Rules of civ. P. She then promised to send plaintiff the requested copies, as long as it would be okay with Vincent McCaughey, defendant(s) counsel.
December 22, 2003: Debra Benveniste sends letter to plaintiff, stating falsely, that the keeper of the records would be the town clerk and a request for true copies would have to be made in writing to the town clerk, despite plaintiff's effort to educate Debra Benveniste of the statutory previsions.
Debra Benveniste also promised in said letter, that she would send plaintiff a copy of the minutes to the meeting of December 16, 2003, which would be approved at the next meeting on January 20, 2004.
January 5, 2004: Plaintiff sends letter to town clerk, requesting certified true copies of documents needed for trial preparation.
March 23, 2004: Town clerk sends letter to plaintiff, explaining that town clerk would not be statutory custodian of minutes and other documents of the PBH.
To this day, the filing date of this complaint, plaintiff was unable to get true copies despite numerous phone calls and visits with the town clerk.
Debra Benveniste also never mailed the copy of the minutes to the PBH meeting of December 16, 2003, she promised to send.

COUNT I, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 514 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 39-48 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the BOH, refused to issue plaintiff a percolation test permit, instead, the BOH requested that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leach facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.
Defendant(s) had no discretion in approving or endorsing plaintiff's plan or application, or issuing plaintiff the sought permit, which was in compliance with all statutory requirements under M.G.L., and was also in compliance with all applicable sections of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, and applicable bylaws of the town of Holland.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.
By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power, or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Plaintiff had an entitlement in the approval or endorsement of his plan, or issuing of the sought permit, and approval or endorsement or issuing of plan or application or permit, was ministerial act, mandated by law.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public interest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
Defendant(s) singled out plaintiff and treated him different than other persons in the same or similar situations, without respect to the statutory criteria, which the equal protection clause forbids.
Plaintiff informed defendant(s) of his rights and informed defendant(s) of the detriment of their unlawful acts. Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
This denial of plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws by the defendant(s), consistently relates to the development, enjoyment, and/or sale of part of his property.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT II, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 471 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 41-48, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the BOH, failed to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system and requested instead that plaintiff submit plans without a leaching facility, and with a holding tank (tight-tank) instead, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT III, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 532 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 43-48, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the BOH, failed to approve plaintiff's application for a construction permit for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system and requested instead that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leaching facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT IV, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 535 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 39-48 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the BOH, refused to issue plaintiff a percolation test permit, instead, the BOH requested that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leaching facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.
Defendant(s) deliberate egregious misconduct is shocking to the conscience, and/or plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest or entitlement in the approval or endorsement of his plan or application, or issuing of the sought permit.
Approval or endorsement of plan or application, or issuing of permit, was ministerial act, mandated by law.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.
By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power, or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Plaintiff was not heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner by the defendant(s), and proceedings were fundamentally flawed, inadequate, irregular and unlawful.
Defendant(s) had no discretion in approving or endorsing plaintiff's plan or application, or issuing plaintiff the sought permit, which was in compliance with all statutory requirements under M.G.L.; and was also in compliance with all applicable sections of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations and applicable bylaws of the town of Holland.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public iinterest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
Plaintiff informed defendant(s) of his rights and informed defendant(s) of the detriment of their unlawful acts. Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
This denial of plaintiff's right of due process consistently relates to the development, enjoyment, and/or sale of part of his property.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress. Defendant(s) violation reach the constitutional threshold.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's right to substantive due process, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT V, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 551 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 41-48, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the BOH, failed to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system and requested instead that plaintiff submit plans without a leaching facility and with a holding tank (tight-tank) instead. BOH also failed to disapprove application (1st set of plans) with a written statement of the reason for such disapproval. BOH violated by its actions and inactions 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT VI, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 555 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 41-48, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members of the Board, failed to approve plaintiff's application for a construction permit for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system and requested instead that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leaching facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT VII, (interfering with contract)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 559 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 37-59 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, intentionally and purposefully and with malice refused to issue plaintiff a percolation test permit and failed to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system. BOH also failed to disapprove application (1st set of plans) with a written statement of the reason for such disapproval, and, failed to approve plaintiff's application for a construction permit for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system and instead asked plaintiff to buy more land he did not need, and, forced plaintiff to design and install a subsurface sewage disposal system without a leach facility, utilizing a holding tank (tight-tank) instead, and declaring the dwelling on said property as a "health hazard," and ordering the cottage "not fit for human habitation," hereby condemning the dwelling. Defendant(s), with their actions, violated 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37; and tried to discourage plaintiff from executing the "purchase agreement," (contract), which existed between William F. Arnold, as the owner and seller of said property, and plaintiff, as the buyer of said property.
This action by the defendant(s) constitutes tortuous interferences with prospective contractual relations, a right secured under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 13, actionable under 42 U.S.C.,s.1983.
Defendant(s) had been informed and were aware of the contract.
Plaintiff had constitutionally protected property interest in executing this contract.
Plaintiff's contract was in conformance with all applicable statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s), by their actions and inactions, injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
Defendant(s)' interferences with prospective contractual relations were consistent with some of the town officials' scheme of harassment, to deny plaintiff his right to execute contracts, and to enjoy and develop his property.
Plaintiff informed defendant(s) of his rights and the consequences of their unlawful acts. Defendant(s), therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs but failed to do so.
The defendant(s) were at all times acting under color of state law in their conduct of business in relation to plaintiff's development and denial of enjoyment of his property, and attempt to sell part of his property.
Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. are not available, inadequate, and impractical for redress; further, statutory limitation on damages under the governmental tort liability act rendered postdeprivation relief inadequate.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
As a result of the defendant(s)' tortuous interferences with prospective contractual relations, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of contract to sell part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT VIII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 573 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 52-58, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, and Fred Grabau, member of the BOH, defendant(s), declared the dwelling on said property a "health hazard," and ordered the cottage "not fit for human habitation," hereby condemning the dwelling in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT IX, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 576 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 52-58, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, and Fred Grabau, member of the BOH, defendant(s), declared the dwelling on said property a "health hazard," and ordered the cottage "not fit for human habitation," hereby condemning the dwelling in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT X, (unreasonable search and seizures)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 580 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 52-58 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, and Fred Grabau, member of the BOH, defendant(s), declared the dwelling on said property a "health hazard," and ordered the cottage "not fit for human habitation," hereby condemning the dwelling in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest in his right to occupy the dwelling, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to be secure in his person and house, guaranteed under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4, 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive. By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Plaintiff was not heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner by the defendant(s), and proceedings were fundamentally flawed, inadequate, irregular and unlawful. Defendant(s) had no reason to condemn the dwelling. The water supply and privy were in compliance with all statutory requirements under M.G.L.; and were also in compliance with all applicable sections of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations and applicable bylaws of the town of Holland.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public interest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s) knew or should have known that their actions were unlawful, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
This unlawful act by the defendant(s) consistently relates to the development and denial of enjoyment of his property.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in condemning of plaintiff's dwelling.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's right to be secure in his person and house, plaintiff suffered substantial damages, including but not limited to denial of enjoyment of his property and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT XI (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 592 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 37-74 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, and Fred Grabau, member of the BOH, Chief of police HPD (name unknown), Ronald Benoit, building inspector, defendant(s), and probably other town officials, intentionally and purposefully refused to issue plaintiff a percolation test permit and failed to approve plaintiff's 1st set of plans for an individual subsurface sewage disposal system. BOH also failed to disapprove application (1st set of plans) with a written statement of the reason for such disapproval, failed to approve plaintiff's application for a construction permit for a individual subsurface sewage disposal system, and, instead asked plaintiff to buy more land he did not need and forced plaintiff to design and install a subsurface sewage disposal system without a leaching facility, utilizing a holding tank (tight-tank) instead, and declared the dwelling on said property a "health hazard," and ordered the cottage "not fit for human habitation," hereby condemning the dwelling.
By their actions, defendant(s) violated 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37, and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.
Plaintiff is a Swiss native and member of a protected class, the class of persons with different national origin.
Plaintiff was singled out and treated differently then other persons in the same or similar situations.
Defendant(s) deprived plaintiff directly or indirectly from seeking the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens under the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, granted under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 4, 5, 13, 14, actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1985; and 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
Conspirators, (defendants), acted with invidiously discriminatory animus and by their actions and inactions acted in furtherance of such conspiracy.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s) injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his personal property.
Defendant's actions were irrational, arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to statutes of M.G.L., bylaws of the town of Holland and public interest, and consistently relate to plaintiff's protected activities, such as development and enjoyment of his property, or his attempt to sell part of his property.
Plaintiff informed defendant(s) of his rights and the consequences of their unlawful acts. Conspirators, (defendants), therefore had knowledge of the wrongs conspired to be done and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs but failed to do so.
The defendant(s) were at all times acting under color of state law in their conduct of business in relation to plaintiff's development and enjoyment of his property, and/or attempt to sell part of his property.
Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. are not available, inadequate, and/or impractical for redress.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
As a result of the defendant(s)' conspiracy, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT XII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 607 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 61-68, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members, approved, (under a condition implemented in the 3rd plan), plaintiff's 2nd plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system. This 2nd (and 3rd) plan is in violation of the so called "TIGHT TANK POLICY." The BOH requested that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leach facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XIII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 610 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 61-68, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon, member of BOH, defendant(s), and other members, approved, (under a condition implemented in the 3rd plan), plaintiff's 2nd plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system. This 2nd (and 3rd) plan is in violation of the so called "TIGHT TANK POLICY." The BOH requested that plaintiff install a septic system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leach facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XIV, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 614 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 70-74, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon and Fred Grabau, members of BOH, defendant(s), approve "as built" plan for subsurface sewage disposal system. This is the 3rd plan. Robert Dymon issues "Certificate of Compliance" on the installed illegal system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leach facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XV, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 617 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 70-74, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Harold Congdon, chairman of the BOH, Robert Dymon and Fred Grabau, members of BOH, defendant(s), approve "as built" plan for subsurface sewage disposal system. This is the 3rd plan. Robert Dymon issues "Certificate of Compliance" on the installed illegal system with a holding tank (tight-tank), without a leach facility, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XVI, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 621 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 79-89, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Dora Metrelis, Maria Scott and John Martin, members of the BOH denied plaintiff's 4th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system and requested new design with impermeable barrier in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XVII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 625 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 79-89, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Dora Metrelis, Maria Scott and John Martin, members of the BOH denied plaintiff's 4th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system and requested new design with impermeable barrier in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XVIII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 629 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 90-113, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Dora Metrelis, chairman of the BOH denies in a letter plaintiff's 5th subsurface sewage disposal system plan, despite the fact that the plan became constructively approved, and failed to approve the plan and issue the requested "disposal works construction permit," in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XIX, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 632 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 90-113, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Dora Metrelis, chairman of the BOH denies in a letter plaintiff's 5th subsurface sewage disposal system plan, despite the fact that the plan became constructively approved, and failed to approve the plan and issue the requested "disposal works construction permit," in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XX, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 636 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 92-122, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
William Hardy, chairman, Humphrey Sutton, Sally Byrne, Helen Kreiger and one other member of HCC, refused to issue receipt for NOI filed with the HCC, failed to make a decision during the public hearing, failed to make a decision within the allowed 21 day period, closed the hearing after 42 days without taking a vote and instead waited until they knew plaintiff had left the country and mailed their unlawful decision December 16, 1993 to plaintiff's P.O. Box address in Brimfield after 119 days, instead of the allowed 21 day period, and only issuing a partial decision, withholding final action on part concerning foundation repair of dwelling, violating 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.131,s.40; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXI, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 639 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 92-122, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
William Hardy, chairman, Humphrey Sutton, Sally Byrne, Helen Kreiger and one other member of HCC, refused to issue receipt for NOI filed with the HCC, failed to make a decision during the public hearing, failed to make a decision within the allowed 21 day period, closed the hearing after 42 days without taking a vote and instead waited until they knew plaintiff had left the country and mailed their unlawful decision December 16, 1993 to plaintiff's P.O. Box address in Brimfield after 119 days, instead of the allowed 21 day period, and only issuing a partial decision, withholding final action on part concerning foundation repair of dwelling, violating 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.131,s.40; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXII, (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 643 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 80-122, and 596-607 above, and further states, that:
Dora Metrelis, Maria Scott and John Martin, members of the BOH and William Hardy, chairman, Humphrey Sutton, Sally Byrne, Helen Kreiger and one other member of HCC, and probably other town officials, intentionally and purposefully conspired against plaintiff. Plaintiff has been whipsawed between BOH and HCC in a chicken or the egg contest which successfully denied plaintiff's rights. Dora Metrelis, Maria Scott and John Martin, members of the BOH denied plaintiff's 4th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system and requested new design with impermeable barrier in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37. As Plaintiff did not give up and filed a subsequent 5th plan, Dora Metrelis, chairman of the BOH denied in a letter plaintiff's 5th subsurface sewage disposal system plan, despite the fact that the plan became constructively approved, and failed to approve the plan and issue the requested "disposal works construction permit," making the approval of plan dependent on prior approval of the HCC. These actions by the BOH are in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37. Co conspirators, William Hardy, chairman, Humphrey Sutton, Sally Byrne, Helen Kreiger and one other member of HCC, refused to issue receipt for NOI filed with the HCC, failed to make a decision during the public hearing, failed to make a decision within the allowed 21 day period, closed the hearing after 42 days without taking a vote and instead waited until they knew plaintiff had left the country and mailed their unlawful decision December 16, 1993 to plaintiff's P.O. Box address in Brimfield after 119 days, instead of the allowed 21 day period, and only issuing a partial decision, withholding final action on part concerning foundation repair of dwelling, violating 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.131,s.40; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
By their actions, defendant(s) violated the above specified sections of 310 CMR 10.00 and statutes of M.G.L., and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.

COUNT XXIII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 646 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 125-148, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Members of the BOH, in furtherance of the consistent attempt to thwart plaintiff's project, requested that plaintiff replace the leach pit by a leach field. Submitted plans, which are the 6th set of plans for a subsurface sewage disposal system, are not acted upon in the 45 day period allowed. Plaintiff's plans are constructively approved after 45 days, due to inaction by the BOH. BOH approved plans finally, after 130 days but failed to issue the necessary "disposals work construction permit," making the issuance of this permit dependent on prior approval of subsurface sewage disposal system plans by the HCC, and filing of a NOI by the plaintiff with the HCC. BOH by its actions and inactions is violating 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXIV, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 649 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 129-197, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
William Hardy, chairman HCC, requires plaintiff, in a letter, to explain to HCC why plaintiff installed a "tight tank," informing plaintiff of an allegedly required variance. William Hardy's, and probably other members of HCC's, request in regard to provisions under 310 CMR 15.00 is outside the Board's jurisdiction and doesn't apply to plaintiff's situation to begin with. HCC refused to issue receipt for NOI filed by plaintiff during the public hearing of July 29, 1994. During this meeting which is still an ongoing public hearing at that time, HCC is offering to issue partial order of condition (foundation and roof work) if plaintiff would withdraw his "request for an adjudicatory hearing" on the superseding order of conditions, DEP file number 184-83, plaintiff filed on May 5, 1994. HCC failed to issue order of conditions within 21 day period, as required under M.G.L., and failed to issue order of conditions as required, only issuing a partial order of conditions on October 17, 1994 (foundation and roof work) after plaintiff agreed not to pursue the adjudicatory hearing. HCC kept the public hearing open until May 2, 1995, and did so without plaintiff's consent. Actions by the HCC are in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); M.G.L., c.131,s.40; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXV, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 653 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 125-148, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Members of the BOH, in furtherance of the consistent attempt to thwart plaintiff's project, requested that plaintiff replace the leach pit by a leach field. Submitted plans, which are the 6th set of plans for a subsurface sewage disposal system, are not acted upon in the 45 day period allowed. Plaintiff's plans are constructively approved after 45 days, due to inactions by the BOH. BOH approves plans finally after 130 days, but fails to issue the necessary "disposals work construction permit," making the issuance of this permit dependent on prior approval of subsurface sewage disposal system plans by the HCC, and filing of a NOI by the plaintiff with the HCC. BOH by its actions and inactions is violating 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXVI, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 657 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 129-197, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
William Hardy, chairman HCC, requires plaintiff, in a letter, to explain to HCC why plaintiff installed a "tight tank," informing plaintiff of an allegedly required variance. William Hardy's, and probably other members of HCC's, request in regard to provisions under 310 CMR 15.00 is outside the Board's jurisdiction and doesn't apply to plaintiff's situation to begin with. HCC refused to issue receipt for NOI filed by plaintiff during the public hearing of July 29, 1994. During this hearing, HCC is offering to issue partial order of condition (foundation and roof work) if plaintiff would withdraw his "request for an adjudicatory hearing" on the superseding order of conditions, DEP file number 184-83, plaintiff filed on May 5, 1994. HCC failed to issue order of conditions within 21 day period, as required under M.G.L., and failed to issue order of conditions as required, only issuing a partial order of conditions on October 17, 1994 (foundation and roof work) after plaintiff agreed not to pursue the adjudicatory hearing. HCC kept the public hearing open until May 2, 1995, and did so without plaintiff's consent. Actions by the HCC are in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); M.G.L., c.131,s.40; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXVII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 661 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 160-175 and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
BOH, John Stevens, chairman, unlawfully reverses their decision of June 27, 1994, when they approved plaintiff's 6th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system, alleging the requirement of another variance, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXVIII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 664 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 160-175 and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
BOH, John Stevens, chairman, unlawfully reverses their decision of June 27, 1994, when they approved plaintiff's 6th plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system, alleging the requirement of another variance, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power, and, with their actions or inactions, deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, and therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.

COUNT XXIX, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 667 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 176-205, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
BOH requests that plaintiff obtain new design for his subsurface sewage disposal system, removing the impermeable barrier the BOH earlier requested. Plaintiff's engineer is forced to draw 7th set of plans, which are filed with the BOH on November 15, 1994. BOH fails to act on the submitted plans within the 45 day period. The plans become constructively approved. BOH delays unlawfully the approval of the plans and the issuing of the "disposal works construction permit" until April 4, 1995. BOH failed to issue Certificate of Compliance" after the system had been installed and inspected by members of the BOH. To this day (filing date of this complaint), Sally Blais, chairman of the BOH, refuses to issue such document. BOH, with its actions, violated 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXX, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 670 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 176-205, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
BOH requests that plaintiff obtain new design for his subsurface sewage disposal system, removing the impermeable barrier the BOH earlier requested. Plaintiff's engineer is forced to draw 7th set of plans, which are filed with the BOH on November 15, 1994. BOH fails to act on the submitted plans within the 45 day period. The plans become constructively approved. BOH delays unlawfully the approval of the plans and the issuing of the "disposals work construction permit" until April 4, 1995. BOH failed to issue Certificate of Compliance" after the system had been installed and inspected by members of the BOH. To this day (filing date of this complaint), Sally Blais, chairman of the BOH, refuses to issue such document. BOH, with its actions, violated 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXI, (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 674 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 123-372 and 596-607 above, and further states, that:
Members of the BOH, members of the HCC, and probably other town officials intentionally and purposefully engaged in a conspiracy with the following illegal activities: Members of the BOH, in furtherance of the consistent attempt to thwart plaintiff's project, requested that plaintiff replace the leach pit by a leach field. Submitted plans, which are the 6th (sixth) set of plans for a subsurface sewage disposal system, are not acted upon in the 45 day period allowed. Plaintiff's plans are constructively approved after 45 days, due to inaction by the BOH. BOH approved plans finally after 130 days but failed to issue the necessary "disposals work construction permit," making the issuance of this permit dependent on prior approval of subsurface sewage disposal system plans by the HCC and filing of a NOI by the plaintiff with the HCC. John Stevens, chairman, unlawfully reverses their decision of June 27, 1994, approving plaintiff's 6th (sixth) plan for a subsurface sewage disposal system, alleging the requirement of another variance. BOH then requested that plaintiff obtain new design for his subsurface sewage disposal system, removing the impermeable barrier the BOH earlier requested. Plaintiff's engineer is forced to draw 7th (seventh) set of plans, which are filed with the BOH on November 15, 1994. BOH fails again to act on the submitted plans within the 45 day period. The plans become again constructively approved. BOH delays unlawfully the approval of the plans and the issuing of the "disposals work construction permit" until April 4, 1995. BOH failed to issue Certificate of Compliance" after the system had been installed and inspected by members of the BOH. To this day (filing date of this complaint), Sally Blais, chairman of the BOH refuses to issue such document for no legitimate reason.
William Hardy, chairman, and other members of the HCC, in ffurtherance of the consistent attempt to thwart plaintiff's project, requested that plaintiff explain to HCC why he installed a "tight tank," informing plaintiff of an allegedly required variance. William Hardy's, and probably other members of HCC's, request in regard to provisions under 310 CMR 15.00 is outside the Board's jurisdiction and doesn't apply to plaintiff's situation to begin with. HCC refused to issue receipt for NOI filed by plaintiff during the public hearing of July 29, 1994. During this hearing, HCC is offering to issue partial order of condition (foundation and roof work) if plaintiff would withdraw his "request for an adjudicatory hearing" on the superseding order of conditions, DEP file number 184-83, which plaintiff filed on May 5, 1994. HCC failed to issue order of conditions within 21 day period, as required under M.G.L., and failed to issue order of conditions as required, only issuing a partial order of conditions on October 17, 1994 (foundation and roof work) after plaintiff agreed not to pursue the adjudicatory hearing. HCC kept the public hearing open until May 2, 1995, and did so without plaintiff's consent.
By their actions and inactions, BOH, defendant(s) violated 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37, and HCC, defendant(s) violated 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a); 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.131,s.40; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.

COUNT XXXII, (retaliation for exercising first amendment rights)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 677 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 169 above, and further states, that:
Retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his first Amendment rrights was the substantial or motivating factor underlying the individual defendant(s)' refusal to issue orders of condition on plaintiff's NOI. Defendant(s) further coerced plaintiff with the promise to issue the order of conditions, if plaintiff would refrain form pursuing the adjudicatory appeal he filed earlier. Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in the issuance of the orders of conditions by the HCC, defendant(s).
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1; actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
Defendant(s) had a direct or indirect involvement and/or were aware of one or more of the following earlier petitions to the government by the plaintiff: Adjudicatory appeal, filed on May 5, 1994, to the General Counsel of the DEP on HCC decision on plaintiff's NOI, file number 184-83; plaintiff's letter of January 16, 1996, to the State Board of Examiners of Electricians of the Commonwealth of Mass., asking their opinion on the utility trench in the lake bed, challenging the electrical inspector's (Richard Blease) misconstrued interpretation of the Electrical Code, denying plaintiff his right to underground service to his dwelling; adjudicatory appeal, filed on February 5, 1997, to the General Counsel of the DEP on HCC conduct in regard to plaintiff's NOI, file number 184-118; lawsuit against the ZBA and the town of Holland in Superior Court, filed on January 16, 1996, docket number HDCV1996-71; and the lawsuit against the PBH and the town of Holland in Superior Court, filed on November 20, 2002, docket number HDCV2002-1196. Petitioning the government is a constitutionally protected activity.
Plaintiff's rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to be free from retaliation, was established with sufficient clarity at the time of defendant(s)' misconduct, and a reasonable town official should have conformed his or her conduct accordingly.
Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. for violation of rights granted under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1. are not available or impractical.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive. By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power, or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified governmental immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public interest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
This denial of plaintiff's rights by the defendant(s), granted under the first Amendment, consistently relates to the development, enjoyment, and/or sale of part of his property.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's first Amendment rights, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT XXXIII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 692 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-215, 224, 227, 228, 250, 263, 264, 269-275, 295, 296, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Richard Blease refused to issue plaintiff an electrical permit and refused to approve plaintiff's underground service which was in compliance with the local and national Electrical Code. Richard Blease, according to Humphrey Sutton, claimed he never got plaintiff's application for an electrical permit; this was a lie. Forced by Richard Blease, plaintiff removed conduit for power lines, which he later had to install again. With his actions, Richard Blease violated sections of 780 CMR and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXIV, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 695 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-215, 224, 227, 228, 250, 263, 264, 269-275, 295, 296, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Richard Blease refused to issue plaintiff an electrical permit and refused to approve plaintiff's underground service which was in compliance with the local and national Electrical Code. Richard Blease, according to Humphrey Sutton, claimed he never got plaintiff's application for a electrical permit, was a lie. Forced by Richard Blease, plaintiff removed conduit for power lines, which he later had to install again. With his actions, Richard Blease violated sections of 780 CMR and M.G.L., c.265,s.37. in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXV, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 699 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 217-222 and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Benjamin Haller, chairman of ZBA, denied plaintiff's application for a special permit for a 5' by 12' balcony by deliberately applying the wrong standard, M.G.L.,c.40A,s.6, instead of M.G.L., c.40A,s.10, ignoring the nonconforming preexisting nature of plaintiff's dwelling and plaintiff's rights under the so called "grandfather clause." By doing so, Benjamin Haller violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Benjamin Haller, chairman of ZBA, defendant, had final policing power. With his actions and/or inactions, defendant deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXVI, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 703 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 217-222, 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Benjamin Haller, chairman of ZBA, denied plaintiff's application for a special permit for a 5' by 12' balcony by deliberately applying the wrong standard, M.G.L.,c.40A,s.6, instead of M.G.L., c.40A,s.10, ignoring the nonconforming preexisting nature of plaintiff's dwelling and plaintiff's rights under the so called "grandfather clause." By doing so, Benjamin Haller violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Benjamin Haller, chairman of ZBA, defendant, had final policing power. With his actions and/or inactions, defendant deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXVII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 706 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-297, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Humphrey Sutton, chairman, Brian Roche and other members of the HCC, are making all kinds of wrong accusations and capricious arbitrary requests; Humphrey Sutton accuses plaintiff of having built a shed not in conformance with approved plans, Humphrey Sutton and Brian Roche request that plaintiff remove underground conduits, accusing plaintiff of violating zoning bylaws with his underground conduit. Humphrey Sutton requests that plaintiff combine all plot plans listed under ATTACHMENT "H" of plaintiff's NOI file number 184-118 onto one plan, requests a delineation map, claims to have jurisdiction over electrical installations, also making the issuance of electrical, fire department and a building permit a prerequisite to issuing orders of conditions; requesting underground conduits to be removed and then relaid, reinspected, and reapproved; requests that plaintiff provide evidence that plaintiff notified the Army Corp. of Engineers of his proposed work; refused to keep the public hearing open as long as plaintiff did not have the aforementioned permits issued; Humphrey Sutton further accused plaintiff of not having complied with notification requirements of abutters; HCC failed to issue orders of conditions within the 21 day period allowed after the closing of the public hearing on October 22, 1996, during which HCC members voted in favor of Plaintiff's NOI, file number 184-118; without notifying plaintiff, HCC members signed order of conditions typed by Humphrey Sutton who resigned on October 9, 1996 and was not a member of HCC anymore; the order of conditions, typed by nonmember Humphrey Sutton, denied two of the proposed activities included in plaintiff's NOI and voted for in the affirmative during the prior meeting of October 22, 1996. Defendant(s) requests are outside the jurisdiction of HCC and/or not required under sections of 310 CMR 10.00, and/or in violation of 310 CMR 10.05(3)(e); 310 CMR 10.05(3)(f); 310 CMR 10.05(4)(f); 310 CMR 10.05(5)(b); 310 CMR 10.05(6)(a);M.G.L., c.131,s.40; M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; and M.G.L., c.268,s.6A.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXVIII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 710 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-297, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Humphrey Sutton, chairman, Brian Roche and other members of the HCC, made all kinds of wrong accusations and capricious arbitrary requests, and violated several statues of M.G.L., and sections of CMR, as described under paragraph 708.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XXXIX, (violation of procedural due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 713 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-297 above, and further states, that:
Humphrey Sutton, chairman, Brian Roche and other members of the HCC, committed all kinds of outrageous, unlawful acts and made all kinds of wrong accusations and capricious arbitrary requests as described under paragraph 622, in violation of laws, rules and violations of sections of the CMR, described under paragraph 622.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to procedural due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.
Defendant(s) deliberate egregious misconduct is shocking to the conscience, and/or plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest or entitlement in the approval or endorsement of his plan or application, or issuing of the sought permit.
Approval or endorsement of plan or application, or issuing of permit, was ministerial act, mandated by law.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.
By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power, or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) actions constitute malicious abuse of process.
Procedural proceedings were fundamentally flawed, inadequate, irregular and unlawful.
Defendant(s) violations reach constitutional threshold, and amount to "constructive taking."
Defendant(s) had no discretion in approving or endorsing plaintiff's plan or application, or issuing plaintiff the sought permit, which was in compliance with all statutory requirements under M.G.L., and was also in compliance with all applicable sections of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations and applicable bylaws of the town of Holland.
Defendant(s) do not enjoy qualified immunity, as such immunity is only available for discretionary acts.
Approval, endorsement or issuance of permit was ministerial act, mandated by law.
Defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his property interest without constitutionally adequate procedural due process.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public interest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
Plaintiff informed defendant(s) of his rights and informed defendant(s) of the detriment of their unlawful acts.
Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
This denial of plaintiff's right to procedural due process by the defendant(s), consistently relates to the development, enjoyment, and/or sale of part of his property.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
There is no state court remedy for procedural due process violation. Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. are not available, insufficient or impractical.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's right to substantive due process, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's right to procedural due process, plaintiff suffered substantial damages, including but not limited to unnecessary expenses for unjustified and unnecessary engineering costs, unnecessary frequent pumping of a septic holding-tank, denial of enjoyment of his property, and mental and emotional distress.

COUNT XL, (interfering with contract)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 736 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 271-273, 295, and 563-573 above, and further states, that:
Richard Blease, electrical inspector, and Humphrey Sutton, chairman of HCC, called Bob Garon and accused him of doing work without a permit to intimidate Mr. Garon. Richard Blease, electrical inspector for the town of Holland, deliberately failed to issue such permit to retaliate against plaintiff. Only after Jim Foley, town selectman, intervened, did Richard Blease acknowledge plaintiff's efforts to obtain the requested electrical permit.
By their actions, defendant(s) violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Richard Blease and Humphrey Sutton intentionally and purposefully and with malice called Bob Garon.
This action by the defendant(s) constitutes tortuous interferences with prospective contractual relations, a right secured under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 13, actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.

COUNT XLI, (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 741 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 206-297, and 596-607 above, and further states, that:
Humphrey Sutton, chairman HCC, Richard Blease, electrical inspector, Benjamin Haller, and other town officials intentionally and purposefully conspired against plaintiff.
By their actions, as outlined under paragraph 694, 701, and 708, defendant(s) committed the violations described under the same paragraphs, and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.

COUNT XLII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 744 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 239-341, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Sally Blais, chairman, and other members of the BOH, defendant(s), by her actions delayed approval of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, in an attempt to block plaintiff's project for 345 days, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLIII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 748 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 239-372, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Sally Blais, chairman, and other members of the BOH, defendant(s), by their actions delayed approval of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, in an attempt to block plaintiff's project for 345 days, in violation of sections of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLIV, (violation of procedural due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 752 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 239-372, and 717-736 above, and further states, that:
Sally Blais, chairman, and other members of the BOH, defendant(s), by their actions delayed approval of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, in an attempt to block plaintiff's project for 345 days, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to procedural due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLV, (retaliation for exercising first amendment rights)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 756 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 239-372, and 681-692 above, and further states, that:
Sally Blais, chairman, and other members of the BOH, defendant(s), by her actions delayed approval of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan, in an attempt to block plaintiff's project for 345 days, in violation of 310 CMR 15.00; M.G.L., c.111,s.31E; M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Sally Blais's actions were in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his first Amendment rights and were the substantial or motivating factor underlying the individual defendant(s)' unlawful delay of plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system plan approval, connecting the proposed and under construction two-story garage. The construction was delayed substantially, since plaintiff could not install needed piping necessary to pour the concrete floor.

COUNT XLVI, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 759 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 374-430, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson, and other members of the PBH, and, Robert Ford, town clerk, failed to endorse plaintiff's 1st ANR plan for a subdivision. Robert Ford refused to accept plaintiff's application and also refused to issue receipt for plaintiff's application. During a regular meeting, Earl Johnson made the remark that the plaintiff should "donate" his property to the town, since plaintiff could not subdivide it, and in order to avoid paying taxes on said property. Defendant(s) practiced an unconstitutional municipal policy of not taking final action during open meetings, and instead informed applicants (plaintiff and buyers of lot A) of their preordained unlawful decisions, made outside regular open meetings. Defendant(s) also conducted an inspection of plaintiff's property without notifying plaintiff. Defendant(s) also failed to send plaintiff written notification of the Board's decision. Defendant(s) are liable in their individual and/or official capacity, since predeprivation hearings were a sham. Defendant(s) violated by their actions, M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.41,s.81P; and M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLVII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 763 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 374-430, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, as described under paragraph 761, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLVIII, (violation of procedural due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 766 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 373-430, and 717-736 above, and further states, that:
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, as described under paragraph 761, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to procedural due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT XLIX, (interfering with contract)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 768 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 374-430, and 563-573 above, and further states, that:
Defendant(s), by their actions, as described under paragraph 761, prevented plaintiff from executing existing contract to sell lot "A."
Defendant(s)' actions constitute tortuous interferences with prospective contractual relations, a right secured under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 13, actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.

COUNT L, (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 771 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 373-430, and 596-607 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, and Robert Ford, town clerk, intentionally and purposeful committed the acts described under paragraph 761, 762, and 763.
By their actions, defendant(s) engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.

COUNT LI, (retaliation for exercising first amendment rights)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 774 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 681-692 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, and Vincent McCaughey, town counsel, defendant(s), intentionally and purposeful committed the acts described under paragraph 761, 762 and 763.
Retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his first Amendment rights was the substantial or motivating factor underlying the individual defendant(s)' actions and inactions in not endorsing Plaintiff's 1st ANR plan.

COUNT LII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 777 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 431-514, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, Robert Ford, town clerk, and Vincent McCaughey, town counsel, failed to endorse plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan for a subdivision. Defendant(s) failed to take final action within the 21 day period allowed by statute; instead, defendant(s) informed applicant, (plaintiff), of their preordained unlawful decisions, made outside regular open meetings. Defendant(s) also conducted an inspection of plaintiff's property without notifying plaintiff. Defendant(s) also failed to send plaintiff written notification of the Board's decision. Defendant(s) unlawfully falsified the official record to the open meeting, the minutes to the meeting of October 15, 2002, to reflect a vote (final action), which in truth never took place. Instead of taking responsibility for their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s)' carried their malicious unlawful scheme to harass and discriminate against plaintiff into the proceedings of the Superior Court. Debra Benveniste committed three counts of perjury, Earl Johnson one count of perjury, and Vincent McCaughey assisted in the commission of defrauding the court, during the post deprivation process. Defendant(s) perjuries were in regards to material facts in the case. By their actions and/or nonactions, defendant(s) denied plaintiff the equal protection of the laws and violated M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.41,s.81P; c.221,s.38; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; M.G.L., c.268,s.1; Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court, thereafter MA R J CT, RULE 3:07 rule 3.3(a)(1), rule 3.3(a)(2), rule 3.3(a)(4), rule 3.4(a), and rule 3.4(b). "Scheme of harassment" is evident in animus against the plaintiff and his project, and the attempt to thwart the project, through adverse administrative action, unrelated to legitimate concerns of the Board.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L. Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT LIII, (violation of substantive due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 780 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 431-514, and 539-551 above, and further states, that:
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions, inactions, and violations, as described under paragraph 779, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT LIV, (violation of procedural due process)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 783 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 373, 431-514, and 717-736 above, and further states, that:
Plaintiff was denied procedural due process, by defendant(s) unconstitutional municipal policy of not taking final action during open meetings, instead, informing applicants, (plaintiff) of preordained unlawful decisions, made outside regular open meetings. Defendant(s) are liable in their individual and/or official capacity, since predeprivation hearings were a sham in which officials failed to take "final action" on plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan and instead rendered decision that was preordained. Defendant(s) violated by their actions, M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.41,s.81P; M.G.L., c.131,s.40; c.221,s.38; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; M.G.L., c.268,s.1; MA R J CT RULE 3:07 rule 3.3(a)(1), rule 3.3(a)(2), rule 3.3(a)(4), rule 3.4(a), rule 3.4(b).
Defendant(s) had final policing power. With their actions, inactions, and violations, as described under paragraph 678, defendant(s) deprived plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property interest, guaranteed under statutes of M.G.L., without due process.
Defendant(s) therefore violated plaintiff's right to procedural due process, guaranteed under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT LV, (interfering with contract)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 787 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 431-514, and 563-573 above, and further states, that:
Defendant(s), by their intentional, purposeful and malicious actions, as described under paragraph 779 and 785, prevented plaintiff from executing existing contract to sell lot A, and also prevented plaintiff from executing implied contract to sell lot B and lot C.
Plaintiff had constitutionally protected property interest in selling lot A, lot B and lot C of his 2nd ANR plan.
The contract to sell lot A existed, the contract to sell lot B and lot C was implied between plaintiff's real estate agent Jean M. Sullivan and the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's existing contract and implied contract was in conformance with all applicable statutes of M.G.L.
This action by the defendant(s) constitutes tortuous interferences with prospective contractual relations, a right secured under Article I of the declarations of rights under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 13, actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
Defendant(s) had been informed and were aware of the contract between plaintiff, the buyers of lot A, and plaintiff's intention to sell lot B and lot C.

COUNT LVI, (conspiracy to deny equal protection)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 794 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 431-514, and 596-607 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, Robert Ford, town clerk, Vincent McCaughey, town counsel, and Kevin Gleason, Chief of HPD and possibly other town officials, intentionally and purposeful committed the acts described under paragraph 779, 785 and 802.
By their actions, defendant(s) violated M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.41,s.81P; M.G.L., c.221,s.38; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; M.G.L., c.268,s.1; MA R J CT RULE 3:07 rule 3.3(a)(1), rule 3.3(a)(2), rule 3.3(a)(4), rule 3.4(a), rule 3.4(b); and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff because of plaintiff's national origin.

COUNT LVII, (retaliation for exercising first amendment rights)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 797 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 342, 393-458, and 681-692 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, and Vincent McCaughey, town counsel, defendant(s), intentionally and purposeful committed the acts described under paragraph 779 and 785.
Retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his first Amendment rights was the substantial or motivating factor underlying the individual defendant(s)' actions and inactions in not endorsing Plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan.

COUNT LVIII, (violation of equal protection of the laws)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 800 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 452-454, 472-480, and 518-529 above, and further states, that:
Kevin Gleason and other members of the HPD, deliberately failed to forward plaintiff's statement and report by the HPD on break-in by two juveniles, and issued unjustified citation for speeding. Defendant(s) by their actions violated M.G.L., c.265,s.37, and other regulations and statutes.
Defendant(s) had final policing power. By their actions and/or inactions violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the laws, guaranteed under Article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, 14; actionable under 42 U.S.C. s.1983.

COUNT LVIX, (conspiracy to interfere with due justice)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 803 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, with emphasis on paragraphs 409, and 452-514 above, and further states, that:
Debra Benveniste, chairman PBH, Earl Johnson and other members of the PBH, Robert Ford, town clerk, and Vincent McCaughey, town counsel, failed to endorse plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan for a subdivision. Instead of taking responsibility for their actions and/or inactions, defendant(s)' carried their malicious unlawful scheme to harass and discriminate against plaintiff into the proceedings of the Superior Court. Defendant(s) unlawfully falsified the official record to the open meeting, the minutes to the meeting of October 15, 2002, to reflect a vote (final action), which in truth never took place. This document was needed during the proceedings in Superior Court as evidence. Debra Benveniste committed three counts, Earl Johnson one count of perjury. Vincent McCaughey, defendants' counsel in said action, knew or should have known, that deponent Debra Benveniste perjured her self during the deposition of October 16, 2003, (three counts), that Earl Johnson perjured him self during the deposition of December 30, 2002, and failed to rectify it, which constitutes assisting a client to defraud the court. By doing so, Vincent McCaughey engaged in unlawful and unethical conduct. Defendant(s) perjuries were in regards to material facts in the case. Vincent McCaughey also inappropriately interfered with due justice by lecturing plaintiff during the deposition of Debra Benveniste, claiming, plaintiff would not have the right to ask leading questions. Vincent McCaughey also made wrong statements about known material facts of law, in pleadings, memorandums, and court hearings in conjunction with plaintiff's civil action in Superior Court, civil action docket number HDCV2002-1196.
Kevin Gleason and other members of the HPD, deliberately failed to forward plaintiff's statement and report by the HPD on break-in by two juveniles, and issued unjustified citation for speeding.
By their intentional and purposeful actions and/or inactions, defendant(s) violated M.G.L., c.39,s.23B; M.G.L., c.41,s.81P; c.221,s.38; M.G.L., c.265,s.37; M.G.L., c.268,s.1; MA R J CT RULE 3:07 rule 3.3(a)(1), rule 3.3(a)(2), rule 3.3(a)(4), rule 3.4(a), and rule 3.4(b); and engaged in a conspiracy and conspired and discriminated against plaintiff to deny plaintiff the due course of justice.
Defendant(s) actions violated plaintiff's rights granted under U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 13. Plaintiff was also injured in his person and his property and was deprived of his right to equal protection, which is granted to him under U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 14. Defendant(s) also violated plaintiff's right to access the courts, which is granted to plaintiff under U.S.C.A., Const. Amend. 1.
Violations by defendant(s) are actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1985 and 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
With this ongoing conspiracy towards plaintiff, the defendant(s) directly or indirectly interfered or tried to interfere, with due course of justice and plaintiff's enjoyment of equal protection of the laws and plaintiff's lawful enforcement or attempted enforcement of his rights as a person and/or as a person belonging to a protected class.
Plaintiff's rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to be free from interferences, was established with sufficient clarity at the time of defendants' misconduct, and a reasonable town official should have confirmed his or her conduct accordingly. Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. for violation of rights granted under U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1, 5, 13, and 14, are not available, insufficient and/or impractical.
Defendant(s) were motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.
By their actions, defendant(s) abused their power, or employed their power as an instrument of oppression and interfered or attempted to interfere with M.G.L., c.265,s.37.
Defendant(s) arbitrary, irrational conduct is not rationally related to legitimate concerns of actors, government or public interest, and injured plaintiff directly or indirectly in his person and personal property.
This denial of plaintiff's rights by the defendant(s), consistently relates to the development, enjoyment, and/or sale of part of his property.
Defendant(s) violations create on their face a mandatory entitlement for redress.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications, and other actions.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's first Amendment rights, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of the enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT LX, (intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 819 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth, and further states, that:
Acts by defendant(s) subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and inflicted extreme mental and emotional distress.
Defendant(s) acted with intent and malice, and thereby inflicted intentionally extreme mental and emotional distress.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
Violations by defendant(s) are actionable under 42 U.S.C., s.1983.
Plaintiff's rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances and to be free from deliberate infliction of mental and emotional distress, was established with sufficient clarity at the time of defendant(s)' misconduct, and a reasonable town official should have confirmed his or her conduct accordingly. Defendant(s) therefore had knowledge of the wrongs to be done, and would have had the power to prevent the commission of the wrongs, but failed to do so.
Remedies under statutes of M.G.L. for deliberate infliction of extreme mental and emotional distress are not available, insufficient and/or impractical.
As a result of the defendants' intentional infliction of extreme mental and emotional distress, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of the enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

COUNT LXI, (violation of Massachusetts civil rights act)
Plaintiff hereby repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 827 above, with the same force and effect as if herein set forth,, and further states, that:
The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L., c.12,s.11I, protects the exercise of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from interferences by "threats, intimidation or coercion."
Acts by defendant(s) subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Defendant(s), aided abetted and participated knowingly willfully and with malice as principals or former principals, by them selfs or in acts of the different Boards and Departments as members of such Boards and Departments.
Defendant(s) acted at all times under color of state law in their treatment of plaintiff's various applications and other actions.
As a result of the defendant(s)' violation of plaintiff's civil rights, plaintiff suffered one or more of the following: Substantial damages, including but not limited to, delayed and/or blocked development of his property, denial of the enjoyment of his property, failed execution of sale of part of his property, lost profits, inability to finance the completion of his two-story garage, and extreme mental and emotional distress.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully demands that;

judgment be entered in his favor and against defendant(s) on all counts;

that the court award compensatory damages to plaintiff and against defendant(s), in the amount of $ 100,000.00 for the failed sale of lot A, due to violation of plaintiff's constitutionally protected right to due process and denial of plaintiff's property interest in the endorsement of his 1st ANR plan, and interference with plaintiff's contract to sell lot A by blocking plaintiff's 1st ANR plan, by the defendant(s);

that the court award compensatory damages in the amount of $ 600,000.00 to plaintiff and against the defendant(s), for the failed sale of lot A, lot B and lot C, due to the PBH and their members, defendant(s), violation of plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights to equal protection, violation of plaintiff's right of due process, and defendant(s) denial of plaintiff's property interest in the endorsement of his 2nd ANR plan, and interference with plaintiff's contract to sell lot A, and the implied contract to sell lot B, and lot C of plaintiff's 2nd ANR plan, by the defendant(s);

that the court award compensatory damages in the amount of $ 1,000,000.00 to the plaintiff and against the defendant(s), for extreme mental and emotional distress, caused by the repeated violation and deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional, civil, and statutory rights, in more specific terms, the conscious, deliberate, malicious, repeated and continued unlawful, refusal, interference, and denial of plaintiff's applications to the BOH, HCC, HPD, PBH, ZBA, town clerk, and electrical inspector, defendant(s), by the defendant(s);

that the court award compensatory damages in the amount of $ 48,000.00 to the plaintiff and against the defendant(s), for expenses plaintiff had as result of unnecessary cost for engineering, frequent pumping of a tight-tank, delineation map, and legal fees, as a result of defendant(s) violations;

that the court award, exemplary and punitive damages in the amount of $ 2,400,000.00 to the plaintiff and against the defendant(s), for injuries caused by the repeated violation and deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional, civil, and statutory rights; in more specific terms, the conscious, deliberate, malicious, repeated and continued unlawful, refusal and denial of plaintiff's applications to the different town Boards and Departments, denial of plaintiff's constitutional protected property interests, retaliatory discrimination of the plaintiff, discrimination based on plaintiff's national origin, harassment of the plaintiff, conspiracies towards plaintiff, intimidating of plaintiff, denial of plaintiff's enjoyment of his property, denial and delay to develop his property, forcing plaintiff to waste his financial resources, denial to execute his protected activities, denial of equal protection, inflicting extreme mental and emotional distress to plaintiff, and other violations of plaintiff's rights, by some of the town officials, defendant(s);

that the court award compensatory damages in the amount of $ 28,000.00 to plaintiff and against the defendant(s), for lost income for the year of 2003, and an additional $ 28,000.00 for any subsequent year until the final adjudication of this case, since plaintiff had and will have to study the law and fight for his rights and was and will be unable to pursue his business, due to trespass by defendant(s), and plaintiff's inability to finish his two story garage with storage, office and workshop, needed to conduct his home antique business, due to lack of money he does not have because he can't sell his property;

that the court grant injunctive relief for the plaintiff, and against the BOH, in ordering the BOH (defendant(s), to issue a certificate of compliance for plaintiff's subsurface sewage disposal system for which the plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property interest;

that the court grant injunctive relief for the plaintiff and against all defendant(s), to order that all defendant(s) stop retaliating, discriminating, conspire and harass plaintiff, to insure future discontinuation of trespass by the defendant(s);

that the court further award such other cost and relief as the court deems proper.

Defendant(s) are liable in their official and/or individual capacity.

Plaintiff requests a trial by jury.

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE A STATUE MORE CLEARLY DESIGNED "FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD" AND "TO PREVENT INJURY AND WRONG," THAN S, 1983.
Justice William J. Brennan

Respectfully submitted by the Plaintiff pro se

Holland, April 21, 2004

Peter K. Frei, PRO SE
P.O. Box 500
BRIMFIELD, MA 01010-0500
phone: 413 245 4660
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(http://www.01521.com/fed/afcompln.htm)